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DOMESTIC LAW CREATING INTERNATIONAL 
REGIMES: 
HOW LEGAL FORMALISM IS HOBBLING U.S. FOREIGN 
POLICY 
 
International law has always been contested. In recent years, 
however, competition between States to influence the trajectory of 
international law has intensified. Unfortunately, most 
international lawyers and policy makers still employ an 
impoverished understanding of the way in which international law 
is created (i.e., through formal international negotiations or as 
developed through custom). In this article, I argue that this 
formalist perspective neglects the foundational role of domestic 
lawmaking and regulation in the development of international law. 
Indeed, this paper shows that domestic action has historically been 
a direct causal antecedent to international legal regimes, and 
concludes that States must fundamentally reconsider the 
underpinnings of international law if they hope to effectively 
advance their national interests in international politics. 
These findings are born out through four case studies, which 
analyze the development of international legal regimes for the 
continental shelf, bribery of foreign officials, data privacy, and 
artificial intelligence. In each case study, I apply an analytic model 
rooted in Aristotelian understandings of causation, and expanded 
upon through the constructivist legal literature. Throughout, the 
paper provides concrete suggestions as to how States can re-
imagine their approach towards international law to better advance 
their interests in the increasingly fragmented, yet still highly 
i n t e r c o n n e c t e d ,  w o r l d  o f  i n t e r n a t i o n a l  p o l i t i c s . 
 
Christopher Mirasola   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
  International law is generally understood to be 
created by treaty or custom developed over time and 
adhered to out of a sense of international legal obligation.1 
                                                 
 
 
1 Or in more detail, as outlined by the Statute of the International Court 
of Justice “1. The Court, whose function is to decide in accordance with 
international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: (a) 
international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing 
rules expressly recognized by the contesting states; (b) international 
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Formally, this may be the received wisdom. Practically, this 
definition obscures much of what actually comes to 
constitute international law. In this paper, I build on 
scholarship regarding the diffusion and socialization of 
international norms to argue that (1) domestic legal action 
can be a tool for creating international legal regimes and, 
therefore, (2) the foreign policy establishment should more 
directly engage in domestic lawmaking to shape the 
trajectory of international law. 
  Legal formalism fundamentally informs the U.S. 
foreign policy establishment’s understanding of 
international law. Take, for example, the development of 
norms for State conduct in cyberspace. In 2004, the United 
Nations (UN) General Assembly established a Group of 
Governmental Experts tasked with considering “existing 
and potential threats in the field of information security, as 
well as possible measures to limit the threats emerging in 
this field.”2 This group held five sessions from 2004 to 2017, 
two of which ended with consensus reports on international 
law regarding operations in cyberspace.3 In the summer of 
                                                                                                                                  
 
 
custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (c) the general 
principles of law recognized by civilized nations; (d) subject to the 
provisions of Article 59, judicial decisions and the teachings of the most 
highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for 
the determination of rules of law.” Statute of the International Court of 
Justice art. 38, ¶1, June 26, 1945, 33 U.S.T. 993.  
2 G.A. Res. A/Res/59/61, at 2 (Dec. 16, 2004), 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/59/
61.    
3 Ann Valjataga, Back to Square One? The Fifth UN GGE Fails to Submit a 
Conclusive Report at the UN General Assembly, NATO COOPERATIVE CYBER 
DEFENCE CENTRE OF EXCELLENCE (Sept 1, 2017), https://ccdcoe.org/back-
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2017, however, the Group was unable to agree on (1) the 
right of response to internationally wrongful acts, (2) the 
right to self-defense, and (3) the applicability of the laws of 
war to cyber operations.4 Reactions to this failure reflect the 
extent to which legal formalism dominates in the foreign 
policy establishment. Ann Valjiataga at NATO’s cyber 
center, for example, wrote that, “The reasons for the failure 
undermine the very foundations of any meaningful legal 
debate over international cyber security.”5 She went on to 
conclude that, “norm-based universal consensus has worked 
for nuclear disarmament but proven to be a rocky road in 
almost all other fields, and cyber is no exception.”6 Michael 
Schmitt and Liis Vihul similarly noted that, “Since no 
international lawyer can, in 2017, deny [international law’s] 
applicability to cyber activities, the failure of the GGE 
[Group of Governmental Experts] can only be interpreted as 
the intentional politicization in the cyber context of well-
accepted international norms.”7 Michele Markoff, then U.S. 
Deputy Coordinator for Cyber Issues, remarked that, “our 
work has been in vain” and that “this is particularly 
disappointing given the work this Group has done . . . to 
reach common understandings on the implementation of 
stabilizing measures, including voluntary, non-binding 
                                                                                                                                  
 
 
square-one-fifth-un-gge-fails-submit-conclusive-report-un-general-
assembly.html. 
4 Michael Schmitt & Liis Vihul, International Cyber Law Politicized: The UN 
GGE’s Failure to Advance Cyber Norms, JUST SECURITY (June 30 2017), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/42768/international-cyber-law-
politicized-gges-failure-advance-cyber-norms/.  
5 Valjataga, supra note 3. 
6 Id. 
7 Schmitt & Vihul, supra note 4.  
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norms of responsible State behavior in cyberspace.”8 More 
recently, UN Secretary General António Guterres told the 
Munich Security conference that, “It’s high time to have a 
serious discussion about the international legal framework 
in which cyberwars take place.”9 Taking on this charge, Tim 
Mauer and Kathryn Taylor outline only three options – 
restarting the Group process, negotiating a Digital Geneva 
Convention, or negotiating more tailored bilateral or 
multilateral agreements.10  
 Setting the necessity and utility of establishing 
international norms for State conduct in cyberspace aside,11 
                                                 
 
 
8 U.S. Dep’t of State, Explanation of Position at the Conclusion of the 
2016-2017 UN Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Developments 
in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of 
International Security, remarks by the Department of State 
Deputy_Coordinator_for_Cyber_Issues_(June_23,_2017), 
https://www.state.gov/s/cyberissues/releasesandremarks/272175.htm
. 
9 U.N. Secretary-General, Address at the Opening Ceremony of the 
Munich Security Conference 
(Feb._16,_2018),_https://www.un.org/sg/en/content/sg/statement/20
18-02-16/secretary-general%E2%80%99s-address-opening-ceremony-
munich-security. 
10 Tim Maurer & Kathryn Taylor, Outlook on International Cyber Norms: 
Three Avenues for Future Progress, JUST SECURITY (March 2, 2018), 
https://www.justsecurity.org/53329/outlook-international-cyber-
norms-avenues-future-progress/.  
11 Others have argued, for example, that, “the GGE put the cart before 
the horse by calling for an affirmation of legal principles without 
detailing them or understanding their consequences for military 
strategies.” Arun Sukumar, The UN GGE Failed. Is International Law in 
Cyberspace Doomed As Well?, LAWFAREBLOG (July 4 2017), 
https://lawfareblog.com/un-gge-failed-international-law-cyberspace-
doomed-well. Others have also argued that, “Beijing [widely understood 
to have been one of the recalcitrant States, along with Russia and Cuba] 
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these statements and proposals reveal a common 
presumption that formal negotiations are the only 
meaningful route towards creating international norms and 
law. By stepping away from this formalistic view, however, 
we can see that such a perspective is at least 
counterintuitive. Why is it that norms can only be 
meaningfully developed in formal multilateral fora? The 
literature on norms diffusion certainly does not make this 
presumption. Yet it remains widely held. Brad Smith, 
President and Chief Legal Officer at Microsoft, for example, 
has called on States to negotiate a Digital Geneva 
Convention to “protect[] civilians from nation-state attacks 
in times of peace.”12 State and non-governmental 
organization (NGO) efforts to address (or ban) lethal 
autonomous weapon systems have focused almost 
exclusively on multilateral negotiations within the 
Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons.13 This 
                                                                                                                                  
 
 
has never liked the idea that international law applies to cyberspace, and 
began walking back the 2013 report almost as soon as the ink was dry.” 
Adam Segal, The Development of Cyber Norms at the United Nations Ends in 
Deadlock. 
Now_What?,_COUNCIL_ON_FOREIGN_RELATIONS_(June_29,_2017), 
https://www.cfr.org/blog/development-cyber-norms-united-nations-
ends-deadlock-now-what.  
12 Brad Smith, The need for a Digital Geneva Convention, MICROSOFT ON THE 
ISSUES (Feb. 14 2017), https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-
issues/2017/02/14/need-digital-geneva-convention/.  
13 See, e.g., Killer robots: World's top AI and robotics companies urge United 
Nations to ban lethal autonomous weapons, MEDIANET (Aug. 21 2017), 
http://www.medianet.com.au/releases/141447/; See also, Josh Dorsin, 
U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, Statement on the way forward - STATEMENT BY THE 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE AT THE CONVENTION ON CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL 
WEAPONS GROUP OF GOVERNMENTAL EXPERTS ON LETHAL 
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consistent assumption that only international, formal 
processes can create international rules of the road 
needlessly restricts a State’s ability to advance its national 
interests. 
  Before outlining the rest of this paper, a quick note to 
clarify my argument. I am not arguing that an enactment of 
domestic law, alone, can formally bind other States. 
Domestic law, alone, creates neither conventional nor 
customary international law.14 I am arguing, instead, that the 
formalist vision of international law entirely misses the 
point. States create international legal regimes to advance 
national interests and further a given set of values. When 
policymakers want to develop international law, they are 
saying that an issue set exists for which present practices 
insufficiently advance national interests. Domestic law, even 
and especially when not grounded in existing international 
law or practice, can advance national interests in the 
international arena. Stated another way, domestic legislative 
enactments can have a first mover effect on the creation of 
international legal regimes. Formal international 
negotiations are needed to make these new practices (more) 
binding, but they are not required to establish those new 
practices in the first instance.  
  Perhaps unwittingly, the United States has used 
domestic law in the creation of many international legal 
                                                                                                                                  
 
 
AUTONOMOUS+WEAPONS+SYSTEMS+(Nov.+17+2017), 
https://geneva.usmission.gov/2017/11/17/ccw-gge-meeting-on-laws-
u-s-statement-on-the-way-forward/.  
14 Of course, domestic law enacted pursuant to a sense of international 
legal obligation would be evidence of customary international law. Here, 
however, we are dealing with circumstances in which the concerned 
State does not believe that there is an applicable rule of international law. 
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regimes. I will highlight two examples in this paper: (1) the 
effect of Harry Truman’s 1945 Presidential Proclamation on 
the creation of a regime for the continental shelf in the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and (2) the 
effect of Congress passing the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
(FCPA) on the creation of the OECD Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in 
International Business Transactions (Bribery Convention). 
Both cases begin with domestic legal enactments not 
grounded in a sense of international legal obligation. Those 
domestic legal enactments meaningfully advanced the 
creation of a formal international legal regime, subsequently 
formalized through international negotiation. They differ in 
the extent to which they have been generalized globally. 
UNCLOS, as a comprehensive set of legal regimes governing 
maritime activities during peacetime, entered into force in 
1994 and is adhered to by 168 States Parties.15 The OECD 
Bribery Convention entered into force in 1999 and is adhered 
to by 43 countries.16 A historic analysis of each case will 
show that domestic policymakers should more seriously 
consider using domestic legal instruments in the creation of 
international legal regimes.  
 Part I begins by outlining the definitions, assumptions, and 
theory underpinning my analysis. As Keohane and Nye 
once remarked, “theory is inescapable . . .. Pragmatic 
policymakers may think that they need pay no more heed to 
                                                 
 
 
15 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 76(1), Dec. 10, 
1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
16 OECD, OECD CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC 
OFFICIALS+IN+INTERNATIONAL+BUSINESS+TRANSACTIONS+(2018), 
http://www.oecd.org/corruption/oecdantibriberyconvention.htm.  
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theoretical disputes over the nature of world politics than 
they pay to medieval scholastic disputes over how many 
angels can dance on the head of a pin. Academic pens, 
however, leave marks in the minds of statesmen with 
profound results for policy.”17 In this spirit, Part I clarifies 
key terms interchangeably and often imprecisely used in the 
policy, and academic, communities. I then briefly outline my 
assumptions regarding the nature of international politics 
before explaining the causal mechanisms by which domestic 
law creates international legal regimes. Part II then shows 
how the historic record supports my causal theory. I first 
present the continental shelf and FCPA case studies before 
taking on contemporaneous examples – data privacy and 
artificial intelligence (AI). Based on this analysis, Part III 
concludes by providing policy recommendations for the U.S. 
government, though many of these lessons can be 
generalized to other States.   
 
II. DEFINITIONS, ASSUMPTIONS, AND CAUSAL THEORY 
 
a. DEFINING KEY TERMS 
 
 Scholars of international relations and international law 
use a dizzying amount of jargon. All too often, the terms 
used lack rigorous meaning. For example, international 
regimes have been notably defined as “sets of implicit or 
explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a 
                                                 
 
 
17 ROBERT KEOHANE & JOSEPH NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE: 
WORLD POLITICS IN TRANSITION 4 (2d ed. 1989). 
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given area of international relations.”18 But what 
differentiates principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures? Indeed, on the next page the author admits that 
“The rules of a regime are difficult to distinguish from its 
norms; at the margin, they merge into one another.”19 Yet 
another page later the conceptual picture gets more 
confused, “Principles, norms, rules, and procedures all 
contain injunctions about behavior; they prescribe certain 
actions and proscribe others.”20 Unanswered, however, is 
why we would use so many different terms to refer to the 
same conceit.  
 Drawing largely from constructivist literature, I will 
instead use three terms – agents, rules, and regimes. Agents 
are entities that “act in society to achieve goals.”21 They both 
observe patterns of behavior and, if existing patterns of 
behavior are disadvantageous, “will act to change them.”22 
In the international arena, these agents include “individuals 
and a variety of functional groups, as well as national and 
                                                 
 
 
18 ROBERT KEOHANE, AFTER HEGEMONY: COOPERATION AND DISCORD IN 
THE WORLD POLITICAL ECONOMY 57 (1984). 
19 Id., at 58. Keohane goes on to argue that “Rules are, however, more 
specific; they indicate in more detail the specific rights and obligations of 
members.” This distinction, however, is largely unhelpful. How much 
more specific? Need rules be technical? Can we say that there is an 
international norm against female genital mutilation, or is this too 
concrete?  
20 Id., at 59.  
21 NICHOLAS GREENWOOD ONUF, Constructivism, in MAKING SENSE 
MAKING WORLDS 5, (2013). 
22 Id., at 6.  
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subnational units.”23 Neoclassical realists, and the realist 
tradition more broadly, “posits that territorial states are the 
primary units in the international system.”24 While I do not 
presume an equality of capacity or importance between 
agents, especially regarding national security, I include non-
State actors and supranational organizations in my analysis.  
 Rules are “statements that tell people what we should 
do.”25 This more general definition encompasses both 
“norms” and formal legal rules – both of which exist on a 
spectrum of formality and bindingness. As more agents 
adhere to a particular rule, it becomes normatively 
stronger.26 There are incentives for rules to become 
formalized through the legal process – legally constituted 
rules more clearly identify “what the rules are, how much 
they matter to other agents, and what consequences they can 
expect from not following them.”27 While this distinction 
between more and less formal rules may be important in 
international politics, it is less important when thinking 
about the diffusion of patterns of behavior (which in much 
of the literature is called norms diffusion). It is important to 
note that, for constructivists, rules and agents are mutually 
constitutive. Onuf argues that, “rules tell us who the active 
participants in a society are. Constructivists call these 
                                                 
 
 
23 K.J HOLSTI, Change in the International System: Interdependence, 
Integration, and Fragmentation” in CHANGE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 
25 (Ole Holsti, Randolph Siverson, & Alexander George, eds. 1991). 
24 NORRIN RIPSMAN, JEFFREY TALIAFERRO, & STEVEN LOBELL, 
NEOCLASSICAL REALIST THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 35 (2016). 
25 Onuf, supra note 21, at 4.  
26 Id., at 13. 
27 Id. Emphasis omitted.  
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participants agents.”28 This seemingly metaphysical insight is 
actually quite intuitive. Women, as political agents in 
American politics, were simultaneously redefined by the 19th 
Amendment and essential to the creation and passage of the 
19th Amendment.   
 Finally, “families of rules and related practices [are often 
called] regimes.”29 Regimes are typically organized around a 
certain set of issues, on the theory that the issues are “so 
closely linked that they should be dealt with together.”30 
They can be more or less stable, though regimes are never 
fixed.31 Agents cannot entirely control the nature of regimes 
through their constituent rules – “unintended consequences 
frequently form stable patterns with respect to their effect on 
agents.”32   
 Armed with this lexicon, I’ll restate the thesis. Agents in 
international politics, and States in particular, can constitute 
international regimes, on any given issue, by creating rules 
at the domestic level. As will be shown below, this causal 
chain is always contested – regimes are never fixed. And not 
all agents will be equally empowered in the creation of 
international regimes – the rules of international law 
empower, for example, States over even the most well 
endowed multinational corporations. Before getting too far 
                                                 
 
 
28 Id., at 4.  
29 Id., at 13.  
30 KEOHANE, supra note 18 at 61.  
31 ONUF, supra note 21 at 5.  
32 Id., at 6. Onuf takes the example of the price of a commodity in a 
perfect market. Based on a particular set of rules, and given an 
adequately large number of agents, any one agent loses the ability to set 
price in the market. 
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into this analysis, a few comments on the assumptions I 
make about the nature of international politics.  
b. ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING THE INTERNATIONAL 
POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 
 As a baseline, I assume that uncertainty pervades 
international politics.33 This includes uncertainty about the 
intentions of other agents, the actions other agents might 
take, their present and future capacity, etc. Notwithstanding 
this uncertainty, the post-Cold War world has become 
strikingly interdependent. Keohane and Nye provide a 
useful framework for understanding this complex 
interdependence. First, multiple channels connect societies, 
from formal relations between States to less formal contacts 
between transnational organizations.34 Importantly, there is 
considerable variability in the extent to which individual 
agents are connected. A State’s degree of connectivity is 
correlated with its vulnerability or sensitivity to actions 
taken by other international agents.35 Second, there is an 
“absence of hierarchy among issues.”36 This means both that 
(1) military security is not always the most important issue 
for a State and (2) military power will not always be 
determinative in advancing a State’s interests.37 
                                                 
 
 
33 KEOHANE, supra note 18 at 257. 
34 KEOHANE, supra note 18 at 26.  
35 Id., at 12. This dichotomy between sensitivity and interdependence will 
be discussed at greater length in the next subsection. 
36 Id., at 25.  
37 Keohane and Nye also present a third pillar of complex 
interdependence – that “military force is not used by governments 
toward other governments within the region, or on the issues, where 
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Interdependence in an uncertain world is not necessarily 
beneficial. As Holsti notes, “increased transaction flows can 
lead to dependency, exploitation, conflict, and violence as 
well as to more collaboration and mutual knowledge.”38 In 
this regard, I do not deviate too far from the realist tradition, 
which sees international politics as being characterized by 
anarchy.39    
  International law cannot be separated from the 
political realities of this international environment. Hans 
Morgenthau, who trained first as a lawyer, was critical of so-
called legalism, “the artificial separation of the juridical 
sphere from not just the normative spheres of mores and 
morals considerations, but also of all insights from the social 
sciences and psychology.”40 So while I acknowledge that 
international relations is a legal (or at least rule-infused) 
environment,41 we must be cognizant of the political 
conditions within which any international regime exists.42 
 
c. CAUSATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
                                                                                                                                  
 
 
complex interdependence prevails.” Id. While the first two pillars, noted 
above, are assumptions of complex interdependence, this third pillar is 
more of a conclusion. As such, I do not use it to describe my 
understanding of international politics.  
38 Holsti, supra note 23, at 28. 
39 Jack Snyder, Introduction: New Thinking About the New International 
System, in COPING WITH COMPLEXITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 11 
(Jack Snyder & Robert Jervis, eds. 1993) (characterizing Waltz’s theory of 
structural realism).  
40 OLIVER JÜTERSONKE, MORGENTHAU, LAW AND REALISM 146 (2010).  
41 ONUF, supra note 21, at 13. 
42 JÜTERSONKE, supra note 40, at 159. 
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  I take what Milja Kurki calls a critical realist approach 
to causation (notwithstanding the fact that the roots of this 
approach are primarily Aristotelian). Kurki finds that most 
social science scholarship treats “ideas, rules, norms and 
discourse as non-causal.”43 This understanding of cause is 
unduly narrow, particularly in the study of international 
relations, where observation and controlled experimentation 
to determine that A action produces B outcome is 
exceedingly difficult. Instead, Kurki explains that, “certain 
aspects of the Aristotelian account of causation can be useful 
in elucidating the nature of different senses in which we 
might apply the concept of cause.”44 A few notes of caution 
before we proceed. For Aristotle, causation was an expansive 
concept – objects as well as events had causes.45 Indeed, 
Aristotle’s understanding of cause was more akin to our 
understanding of explanation – why something is the way it 
is.46 In Physics, Aristotle identifies four types of cause:  
(1) Material Cause – “that out of which a thing comes to be 
and which persists” (e.g., the bronze of a bronze statute);  
(2) Formal Cause – “the form or the archetype, i.e. the 
statement of the essence, and its genera” (e.g., schematics for 
the statute); 
(3) Effective Cause – “the primary source of the change or 
coming to rest” (e.g., the sculptor who makes the statute); 
and 
                                                 
 
 
43 MILJA KURKI, CAUSATION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: RECLAIMING 
CAUSAL ANALYSIS 12 (2008).  
44 Id., at 13.  
45 S. Marc Cohen, The Four Causes, THE UNIV OF WASHINGTON (Sept. 23, 
2016), https://faculty.washington.edu/smcohen/320/4causes.htm.  
46 Mindful of this distinction, I will continue to use the word “cause” for 
the sake of simplicity.  
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(4) Final Cause – “the sense of end or ‘that for the sake of 
which’ a thing is done” (e.g., the sculptor’s intent in creating 
the statute).47  
  Let’s put it more simply. The material cause is the 
tangible factors out of which something is constituted, those 
parameters which enable and constrain action.48 The formal 
cause is definitional – the set of rules that give meaning to 
some end product.49 The effective cause is closest to what we 
usually call causation – it is the action undertaken to actually 
craft the end product.50 The final cause is intent – the 
subjective purpose for which the end product is made.51  
  Much of the existing literature on causation in 
international law comprehends aspects of critical realist 
causation, though not in these terms. The remainder of this 
subsection expands on each of these four causes, and their 
treatment (or lack thereof) in traditional international law 
scholarship.  
  The material cause, for our purposes, is those factors 
that enable and constrain action. In one sense, this can be 
understood as the attributes of national power. These 
attributes are emphasized most prominently in the realist 
tradition.52 Kenneth Waltz, the father of structural realism, is 
                                                 
 
 
47ARISTOTLE, PHYSICS, (RP Hardie & RK Gaye trans., MIT), 
http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/physics.2.ii.html.  
48 KURKI, supra note 43, at 27. 
49 Id.; Cohen, supra note 45. 
50 KURKI, supra note 43, at 27. 
51 Id. 
52 Other scholarly traditions also consider material factors, though they 
are less likely to use these factors as deterministically. For example, Dina 
Zinnes noted that the most important “composite” variable for 
understanding change in the international system is the “number of 
2018 DOMESTIC LAW, INT’L REGIMES 17 
famous for arguing that the relative distribution of 
capabilities among units is the primary causal variable of 
international politics.53 Typically, capability (and therefore 
power) is understood to include a State’s Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), levels of annual defense spending, the size 
and composition of its armed forces, military research and 
development, population (and other demographic trends), 
natural resource endowments, and geography.54 These 
capabilities are seen as most important in understanding 
“the range of possible bargaining outcomes among states.”55 
If one were looking to understand the series of unequal 
treaties negotiated between the late Qing Dynasty and 
western powers (e.g., the United Kingdom and France) from 
the perspective of material causation, for example, one 
would focus on their military technical advantage and 
economic leverage, particularly through the opium trade. 
  Other scholars have usefully complicated this 
straightforward notion of material cause. Holsti, for 
                                                                                                                                  
 
 
nations within the system and the distribution of power over those 
nations.” Dina Zinnes, Prerequisites for the Study of System Transformation, 
in CHANGE IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 9 (Ole Holsti, Randolph 
Siverson, & Alexander George eds., 1991). Keohane similarly stated that, 
“we should focus first on the [material] constraints imposed on actors 
before examining their choices.” KEOHANE, supra note 19 at 71. Keohane 
and Nye remarked that, “The structure of the system (the distribution of 
power resources among states) profoundly affects the nature of the 
[international] regime (the more or less loose set of formal and informal 
norms, rules, and procedures relevant to the [international] system” and 
“Changes in regime reflect shifts in the distribution of power within the 
issue area.” KEOHANE, supra note 18, at 21 & 137. 
53 RIPSMAN, TALIAFERRO, & LOBELL, supra note 24, at 38. 
54 Id., at 43.  
55 Id.  
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example, argues that other agents’ perception of a State’s 
capabilities is important in the definition of those same 
capabilities.56 Similarly, Kurki cautions that material 
resources should “not . . . be understood in a mere military 
sense,” but also “recognised as constituted through social 
processes involving social actors and socialising principles 
(formal causes).”57 Given the fact that military might will not 
be uniformly dispositive across issue areas, it is important to 
be mindful of elements of national power less emphasized in 
the realist tradition (e.g., soft power). 
  In another sense, material causation includes the 
degree to which an agent is linked to other agents. As noted 
above, agents in international politics are not equally 
connected to each other. From the perspective of regime 
creation, one agent’s connection to other agents can have 
both negative and positive effects.58 On the one hand, more 
links to other agents present more avenues through which 
an agent might instantiate its preferred set of rules. On the 
other hand, more links can increase an agent’s sensitivity 
(responsiveness) to changes wrought by other agents.59 
                                                 
 
 
56 Dina Zinnes, supra note 52, at 12. Keohane also highlights the 
importance of perception. He argues that “actors subject to bounded 
rationality cannot maximize in the classical sense, because they are not 
capable of using all the information that is potentially available.” 
KEOHANE, supra note 18, at 111–12.  
57 KURKI, supra note 44, at 238. 
58 For an example in the human rights framework, Goodman and Jinks 
argue that after a certain quantity of links are made “domestic political 
authorities [may] abjure international [human rights] norms and refrain 
from participation in international [human rights] organizations.” RYAN 
GOODMAN & DEREK JINKS, SOCIALIZING STATES: PROMOTING HUMAN 
RIGHTS THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW 43 (2013).  
59 KEOHANE, supra note 19, at 12.  
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Keohane and Nye also argue that an agent highly sensitive 
to change will not necessarily be vulnerable to that change, 
so long as there are sufficient internal protections to mitigate 
costs or propose less burdensome alternatives.60 An agent’s 
internal protections, again, are tied to its material 
capabilities.  
  The formal cause posits that ideas and rules “define 
or constitute meaning.”61 Dominant ways of conceiving an 
issue “come to inform the intentions and the actions of 
agents, that is, the meanings that constitute social life 
‘condition’ agents’ intentions and actions.”62 This is 
consonant with the constructivist perspective, which 
highlights the importance of language in constituting the 
social world.63 Kurki is quick to point out that formal causes 
do not directly bring about a particular effect – they 
“condition” and “shape” social practices.64 This distinction is 
what separates the critical realist understanding of formal 
cause from most of the existing literature. Take, for example, 
                                                 
 
 
60 KEOHANE & NYE, supra note 18, at 13.  
61 KURKI, supra note 43, at 224. 
62 Id. 
63 ADRIANA SINCLAIR, INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS THEORY AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: A CRITICAL APPROACH 8 (2010). There is, however, 
an important philosophical difference between the constructivist and 
critical realist perspectives. For constructivists, discourses themselves 
constitute the objects that are observed – the objects have no definition 
outside changing discourses. KURKI, supra note 43 at 203. Critical realists, 
however, accept that there is something real that is being perceived, 
independent of a given discourse. Instead, “they argue that concepts, 
meanings and rules also give rise to materially unfolding structures of 
social relations, that is, they give rise to materially embodied ‘internal 
relations’ between agents.” Id., at 210.  
64 Id., at 224–25.  
20 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 26 
Keohane and Nye’s discussion of unilateral initiative, a 
mechanism for changing regimes by which “large state[s] 
may not be able or willing to police the behavior of other 
states, but because of [their] size and importance, [their] 
actions may determine the regimes that govern situations of 
interdependence, both because of its direct effects and 
through imitation.”65 One example of Keohane and Nye’s 
unilateral initiative would be the fact that China established, 
in 1998, the Chinese Center for Disease Control (CDC), 
patterned almost exactly on the U.S. CDC.66 Within our 
framework, this proposition blends material, formal, and 
effective cause. A States’ size and importance is given causal 
effect (material cause – or in our CDC example, the United 
States’ position as a leading authority in public health). They 
also intimate that “direct” tools are used to coerce 
compliance (effective cause – while it’s unclear whether the 
U.S. coerced compliance, there are pressures to create 
institutions that can easily liaise with international 
counterparts). The closest Keohane and Nye get to the 
formal clause is by positing that other agents may imitate the 
larger State’s new pattern of behavior. Issue definition is a 
necessary predicate to imitation. So, in a way, the formal 
cause underpins this entire causal chain. But even imitation 
is blended with the effective cause, insofar as other agents 
have to engage in a process of learning.67  
                                                 
 
 
65 KEOHANE, supra note 18, at 230. 
66 China CDC, INT’L ASSOC. OF NAT’L PUB. HEALTH INST., 
http://www.ianphi.org/membercountries/memberinformation/china.
html.  
67 Ernst Haas’ writing on learning underscores why it should be 
understood as an effective cause. He argues that when learning occurs 
“new knowledge is used to redefine the content of the national interest. 
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  Hints of critical realism can be seen in Goodman and 
Jinks’ work on the promotion of human rights through 
international law. Goodman and Jinks identify three 
mechanisms for influencing a State’s human rights practice – 
material inducement, persuasion, and acculturation.68 In 
material inducement, “actors are influenced to change their 
behavior by the imposition of material costs or the conferral 
of material benefits.”69 This is a blending of the material and 
effective causes – the instruments of State power are used to 
coerce compliance, even if compliance does not accord with 
a State’s perception of its own interests.70 Persuasion is 
similar to Keohane and Nye’s understanding of learning, as 
“target actors are convinced of the truth, validity, or 
appropriateness of a norm, belief, or practice.”71 Unlike 
Keohane and Nye, however, Goodman and Jinks are more 
explicit about the formal causality embedded in this process. 
They argue that persuasion occurs through framing 
(increasing the extent to which a practice resonates with 
already accepted norms) and cuing (providing new 
information, which forces an agent to rethink a prior 
position). Both of these processes are definitional, and 
therefore examples of formal causation. Goodman and Jinks 
get the closest to approximating the formal cause through 
what they term acculturation, “the general process by which 
actors adopt the beliefs and behavior patterns of the 
                                                                                                                                  
 
 
Awareness of newly understood causes of unwanted effects usually 
result in the adoption of different, and more effective, means to attain 
one’s ends.” KEOHANE, supra note 18 at 264–65.  
68 GOODMAN & JINKS, supra note 58, at 2.  
69 Id., at 22.  
70 Id.  
71 Id.  
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surrounding culture. . . . this mechanism induces behavioral 
changes through pressures to assimilate—some imposed by 
other actors and some imposed by the self.”72 Acculturation 
relies on changed definitions, but is understood by the 
authors as much more direct than critical realists would 
believe the formal cause to be.73 An example of acculturation 
they point out is the fact that the number of constitutions 
specifically providing for a right to education increased 
dramatically throughout the 19th century with no 
concomitant increase in local social organizations pushing 
for such a right.74 
  Before considering the effective cause, it is important 
to note that this blending of causes is not necessarily 
problematic – all social outcomes have multiple causes 
within the critical realist framework. Kurki notes that “in 
practice different causes often ‘mesh together’ or 
‘coincide.’”75 Nevertheless, it is useful to more precisely 
understand the pathways through which these effects are 
produced.  
  The efficient cause has been most completely 
addressed by the academic and policy communities. 
Strategies that call for enrolling allies into decision-making 
                                                 
 
 
72 Id., at 4.  
73 For example, Goodman and Jinks argue that this framework can be 
used to “generat[e] concrete, empirically falsifiable propositions about 
the role of the international legal regime in transforming state 
preferences and behaviors.” Id., at 3. A Humean understanding of that is 
at least in tension with the more metaphysical understanding of cause 
advanced by Aristotle.  
74 Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and 
International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 649–50 (Dec. 2004).  
75 KURKI, supra note 43, at 28 & 227. 
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processes are examples of thinking in terms of efficient 
causation (doing x to create y effect).76 So too is imposing 
“negative as well as positive inducements.”77 For example, 
think of a State providing defense materiel in exchange for a 
security partner adhering to the laws of war as that partner 
fights against an insurgent group. The final cause, on the 
other hand, has been less completely appreciated as an 
independent source of causation. It posits that agents’ 
intentions, and other agents’ perception of an agents’ 
intentions, have real causal power.78 This type of causal 
effect can be seen when Keohane and Nye, for example, 
argue that unilateralism “disrupt[s] cooperation in 
international relationship and cast[s] doubt on American 
motivations . . . such approaches may destroy the basis for 
legitimate international regimes.”79  
 
d. CRITICAL REALISM AND THE DOMESTIC ROOTS OF 
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 
 
  I argue that critical realist causation best explains how 
domestic legal action can create international legal regimes. 
While all four types of causation will play a role in the case 
studies presented in Part II, formal causation is the key to 
many of these stories. Indeed, it is the underappreciated, 
independent causal effect of ideas and rules that may largely 
account for the fact that foreign policymakers neglect 
                                                 
 
 
76 KEOHANE , supra note 18, at 34.  
77 Id., at 53 & 79. Note that, as stated above, this also includes leveraging 
capabilities, and therefore is blended with material causation. 
78 KURKI, supra note 43, at 217 & 226. 
79 KEOHANE, supra note 18, at 236.  
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domestic policy tools. Before using this framework to 
advance my thesis, a few implications of this theory should 
be noted.  
  First, the concept of a formal cause implies that rules 
are inherently political. By this I mean that rules necessarily 
advance particular interests, and embody a particular set of 
values. This harkens back to Morgenthau’s critiques of 
legalism as the “instrumentalization of a formalistic 
conception of law by political powers that seek to clothe 
their aspirations in the language of universality.”80 This 
should not be surprising. Rules created by one agent 
necessarily limit the freedom of other agents.81 While 
policymakers working on behalf of current hegemons may 
profit from speaking about law apolitically, to create new 
rules thinking in the same terms is entirely to their 
detriment. 
  Second, and furthermore, the fact that rules 
instantiate values means that rules also instantiate a 
particular hierarchy of power and influence.82 Onuf 
recognized that “starting with rules, as constructivists often 
do, leads quickly enough to patterns of relations that we can 
only describe as a condition of rule.”83 He goes on to say that 
while rules appear to rule, “agents actually do the ruling by 
getting other agents to accept their ideas and beliefs. They 
do so by example and indoctrination. Rule in this form is 
hegemony.”84 Again, this fact can be lost on States that have 
                                                 
 
 
80 JÜTERSONKE, supra note 40, at 147–48 & 173.  
81 ONUF, supra note 21, at 9. 
82 SINCLAIR, supra note 63, at 18. 
83 ONUF, supra note 21, at 7. 
84 Id., at 18.  
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grown comfortable in their hegemonic status. Hegemony in 
any given issue space is an inherently contested and political 
status. Efforts to maintain, or gain, hegemony will then 
necessarily be focused on the contest of ideas (a battle of 
formal causation).  
  Third, formal causation suggests that there are 
substantial benefits to being the first agent to define a given 
issue space. Finnemore and Sikkink, for example, identified 
a three-stage cycle for norm creation – emergence, 
acceptance, and internalization.85 For our purposes, norm 
emergence is important insofar as Finnemore and Sikkink 
note the role of “norm entrepreneurs,” agents that call 
attention to or create issues through the “construction of 
cognitive frames.”86 The degree to which a norm 
entrepreneur (or in our lexicon, a rule entrepreneur) is 
effective in instantiating a particular norm (rule) will depend 
on the other patterns of causation noted above. Again, it is 
important reiterate Finnemore and Sikkink’s reminder that 
this is always a contested process – “new norms [rules] 
never enter a normative vacuum but instead emerge in a 
highly contested normative space where they must compete 
with other norms and perceptions of interest.”87 Causation, 
therefore, is not unidirectional – regimes once created 
remain contestable.  
  Fourth, and last, this framework does not assume that 
any given cause will have an a priori knowable effect. 
Unintended consequences are inherent to any activity in an 
                                                 
 
 
85 Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics 
and Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 4 895, 887–915 (1998).  
86 Id.  
87 Id., at 897.  
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international environment characterized by uncertainty.88 
Jervis argues that unintended consequences stem from two 
sources – (1) the fact that “outcomes are often produced 
through a chain of actions and reactions” and (2) “the result 
of trying to move directly toward a goal may be movement 
in the opposite direction.”89 As to this second point, 
Keohane and Nye note that, “strategies of manipulating 
interdependence are likely to lead to counterstrategies.”90 
This again raises issues of perception and intent (even in the 
creation, or redefinition, of ideas).  
 
III. CASE STUDIES 
 
  Substantively, the continental shelf, international 
corruption, data privacy, and AI have little in common. The 
international legal regimes that have developed (or are 
coming into being) around them, however, raise similar 
critical realist insights. First, in each case a rule entrepreneur 
redefined an issue by unilaterally establishing domestic law 
and/or policy that would powerfully influence positive 
international law (again, noting that this process has not yet 
been completed in the case of data privacy and AI). Second, 
in each case this redefinition sparked counter-strategies from 
agents whose interests diverged from that of the rule 
                                                 
 
 
88 KEOHANE, supra note 18, at 10–11.  
89 Robert Jervis, Systems and Interaction Effects, in COPING WITH 
COMPLEXITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 31 (Jack Snyder & Robert 
Jervis eds., 1993).  
90 KEOHANE, supra note 18 at 16. Of course, the degree of risk that 
military counterstrategies will occur depends on the interests and 
consequences at stake in a given example of international regime 
creation.  
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entrepreneur. These unintended consequences shaped the 
contours of the eventual international legal regime – not 
always in ways agreeable to the rule entrepreneur. Lastly, 
and nevertheless, the rule entrepreneur’s interests are better 
advanced by taking action than they would have been if the 
agent had insisted on formal, international processes from 
the very beginning. I do not mean to suggest that this will 
always be the case – a critical realist approach to foreign 
policy must be attuned to context. And as will be shown in 
the case of the continental shelf, domestic action taken out of 
short-term interest can be coopted by rivals to advance 
international rules at odds with the rule entrepreneur’s long-
term interests. But this should at least indicate the utility of 
domestic action as an opening gambit in the creation of 
international legal regimes. For each of the following cases, I 
first provide a narrative historical overview of the issue 
before applying the critical realist framework. 
 
a. CONSTITUTING THE CONTINENTAL SHELF  
 
  Maritime law is defined by the tension between State 
sovereignty and free access to the sea and its resources. This 
tension was most plainly laid bare by a pair of texts 
published in the 1600s. Hugo Grotius’ Mare Liberum, 
published in 1609 on behalf of the Dutch East India 
Company, argued that, “Every nation is free to travel to 
every other nation, and to trade with it” as a matter of 
natural law.91 John Selden, responding in support of British 
                                                 
 
 
91 HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS: OR THE RIGHT WHICH 
BELONGS TO THE DUTCH TO TAKE PART IN THE EAST INDIAN TRADE 7 (James 
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claims to maritime sovereignty in 1652, argued instead that, 
“the SEA, by the LAVV OF NATURE, or NATIONS is not 
common to all men, but capable of PRIVATE DOMINION or 
Proprietie, as well as the LAND.”92  
  The legal history of the continental shelf is yet another 
instantiation of this age-old debate between Grotius and 
Selden. In the modern law of the sea, UNCLOS Part VI 
governs the continental shelf. It provides that the continental 
shelf:  
comprises the seabed and subsoil of the 
submarine areas that extend beyond [a coastal 
State’s] territorial sea throughout the natural 
prolongation of its land territory to the outer 
edge of the continental margin, or to a distance 
of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from 
which the breadth of the territorial sea is 
measured where the outer edge of the 
continental margin does not extend up to that 
distance.93  
Over this land mass, “the coastal State exercises . . . 
sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and 
exploiting its natural resources.”94 This is an exclusive right, 
“if the coastal State does not explore the continental shelf or 
exploit its natural resources, no one may undertake these 
                                                                                                                                  
 
 
Brown Scott ed., Ralph van Deman Magoffin trans., 2001) (“licere cuivis 
genti quamvis alteram adire, cumque ea negotiari”).  
92 JOHN SELDEN, MARE CLAUSUM SEU (Marchmont Nedham trans., 1652), 
available at 
https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/eebo/A59088.0001.001/1:2?rgn=div1;vie
w=fulltext.  
93 UNCLOS art. 76(1), Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397. 
94 Id. at Art 77(1). 
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activities without the express consent of the coastal State.”95 
These provisions have real weight. In 2007, 14% of the 
United States’ natural gas and 27% of its oil production were 
derived from drilling on its continental shelf.96 When the 
United States laid claim to the continental shelf, then-
Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickles stated that, “the 
Continental Shelf ranks with the lands which we acquired by 
the Louisiana Purchase, or by the opening of the West, or by 
the purchase of Alaska.”97  
  UNCLOS’ articulation of a State’s rights to the 
continental shelf was taken almost verbatim from the 1958 
Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf.98 This is 
                                                 
 
 
95 Id. at Art 77(2).  
96 U.S. DEPT. OF THE INTERIOR, RESOURCES OF THE OUTER CONTINENTAL 
SHELF -  REMARK BY THE DIRECTOR OF OFFSHORE ENERGY AND MINERALS 
MANAGEMENT, MINERALS MANAGEMENT SERVICE, March 17 2009, 
https://www.doi.gov/ocl/hearings/111/ResoursesOnTheOCS_031709.  
97 Harold Ickles, Annual Report of the Secretary of the Interior (1945), 40 
LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE REGIME OF THE HIGH SEAS VOLUME I, U.N. 
Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/1 (Jan. 11, 1951). 
98 Article 2 of the Geneva Convention provided that “The coastal State 
exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of 
exploring it and exploiting its natural resources” and that these rights 
“are exclusive in the sense that if the coastal State does not explore the 
continental shelf or exploit its natural resources, no one may undertake 
these activities, or make a claim to the continental shelf, without the 
express consent of the coastal State.” Convention on the Continental 
Shelf art. 2, April 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 499 U.N.T.S. 311. This is almost 
identical to language in UNCLOS Article 77(1–2). The two conventions 
differ primarily in their definition of the outer boundary of the 
continental shelf (compare, for example, UNCLOS Art 76 with Geneva 
Convention Art 1). This was largely due to technological developments 
that had expanded the depths of the sea amenable to exploitation and 
General Assembly resolutions calling for the resources of the deep 
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particularly striking given that it was only in 1945, thirteen 
years before this Convention was signed, that President 
Harry Truman first introduced the concept of the continental 
shelf. The remainder of this subsection will describe 
Truman’s Presidential Proclamation, outline other States’ 
reactions to it, and explain why it can be seen as the cause of 
today’s regime for the continental shelf.  
 
b. HARRY TRUMAN’S PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION 
 
  Proclamation 2667 on the “Policy of the United States 
with Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and Sea 
Bed of the Continental Shelf” stated for the first time that 
“the United States regards the natural resources of the 
subsoil and sea bed of the continental shelf beneath the high 
seas but contiguous to the coasts of the United States as 
appertaining to the United States, subject to its jurisdiction 
                                                                                                                                  
 
 
seabed to be mined for the “benefit of all mankind.” DONALD ROTHWELL 
& TIM STEPHENS, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 112 (2d ed., 2016). 
These policy imperatives required a new formula for defining the outer 
limits of the continental shelf. A number of alternatives were considered 
throughout the Third Conference on the Law of the Sea. Third U.N. 
Conference on the Law of the Sea, Preliminary study illustrating various 
formulae for the definition of the continental shelf, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.62/C.2/L.98 and Add.1-3 (Official Records of the Third United 
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Volume IX)  (April 18, 1978), 
http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../diplomaticconferences/1973_los/do
cs/english/vol_9/a_conf62_c2_l98_and_add1_3.pdf&lang=E. The 
Conference’s Second Committee eventually settled on a more 
geologically-based formula that left open the possibility of national 
entitlements beyond 200 nautical miles. ROTHWELL & STEPHENS, supra 
note 98 at 113.    
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and control.”99 This extension of jurisdiction was not 
grounded in any international legal right. Instead, President 
Truman argued that, “the exercise of jurisdiction over the 
natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the 
continental shelf by the contiguous nation is reasonable and 
just” and that “the continental shelf may be regarded as an 
extension of the land-mass of the coastal nation and thus 
naturally appurtenant to it.”100  
  In these few short paragraphs we can identify three 
causes of the incipient continental shelf regime. First, there is 
a recognition of material cause – advances in technology 
transformed this submarine area into a monetizable 
resource.101 Changing technology lifted constraints on the 
extent to which a State might plausibly assert rights to this 
vast undersea area and its resources. Other States, also 
forwarding a variety of claims to the continental shelf, 
would point out this same change in circumstances.102 
                                                 
 
 
99 Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12303 (Sept. 28, 1945). 
100 Id. 
101 U.S. Press Release accompanying the proclamation (“The rapid 
development of technical knowledge and equipment occasioned by the 
war now makes possible the determination of the resources of the 
submerged lands outside the three-mile limit.”). Harry Truman, 
Concerning the Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural 
Resources of the Subsoil and Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf (1945), 39 LAWS 
AND REGULATIONS OF THE REGIME OF THE HIGH SEAS VOLUME I, U.N. Doc. 
ST/LEG/SER.B/1 (Jan. 11, 1951).  
102 Saudi Arabia noted that, “by God’s providence valuable resources 
may underlie parts of the Persian Gulf off the coasts of Saudi Arabia, and 
that modern technology by the grace of God makes it increasingly 
practicable to utilize these resources.” Abdul’Aziz ibn’Abdul Rahman Al 
Faisal Al Sa’ud, Royal Pronouncement Concerning the Policy of the Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia with Respect to the Subsoil and Sea Bed of Areas in the Persian 
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Second, Proclamation 2667 is quite explicit about the final 
cause (national interests) motivating the U.S. claim. In 
particular, the proclamation cited “the long range world-
wide need for new sources of petroleum and other 
minerals,” the need “to utilize or conserve these resources,” 
and the State’s concomitant security interest in “keep[ing] 
close watch over activities off its shore which are of the 
nature necessary for utilization of these resources.”103 Again, 
subsequent States would also aver to many of the same 
interests (though, as we will see below, States would also 
use the Proclamation to justify preexisting claims).104  
                                                                                                                                  
 
 
Gulf Contiguous to the Coasts of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 22 LAWS AND 
REGULATIONS OF THE REGIME OF THE HIGH SEAS, VOLUME I, U.N. Doc. 
ST/LEG/SER.B/1 (Jan. 11 1951), [hereinafter, Saudi Declaration]; Abu 
Ihabi noted that “valuable resources underlie parts of the Persian Gulf 
off the coasts of Abu Dhabi and it has become increasingly possible to 
utilize such submerged resources.” Proclamation with respect to the seabed 
and the subsoil of the high seas of the Persian Gulf (June 10 1949), 23 LAWS 
AND REGULATIONS OF THE REGIME OF THE HIGH SEAS, VOLUME I, U.N. Doc. 
ST/LEG/SER.B/1 (Jan. 11 1951), [Hereinafter, Abu Ilhabi Declaration]. 
Similar statements were made by other Arab States under the Protection 
of the United Kingdom, including Ajman, Bahrain, Dubai, Kuwait, 
Qatar, Ras al Khaimah, Sharjah, and Umm al Qaiwain; Mexico found 
that, “growing need for States to conserve those natural resources which, 
throughout the ages, and for various reasons, have been beyond their 
control and have not been fully utilized.” Presidential Declaration with 
respect to continental shelf [sic] (Oct. 29 1945), 13 LAWS AND REGULATIONS 
OF THE REGIME OF THE HIGH SEAS, VOLUME I, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/1 
(Jan. 11, 1951), [hereinafter, Mexican Declaration]. 
103 Proclamation No. 2667, supra note 99. 
104 The Chilean Presidential Declaration considered that, the United 
States, Mexico, and Argentina had claimed the continental shelf “within 
the limits necessary to preserve for the said States the natural riches 
belonging to them.” Presidential Declaration concerning continental shelf 
[sic] (June 23 1947), 6 LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE REGIME OF THE 
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  Third, Proclamation 2667 was a definitional 
instrument, and therefore a formal cause of what would 
eventually come to be the continental shelf regime. This is 
most readily evident by the extent to which the Proclamation 
changed the terms of international discourse regarding State 
claims to submerged resources. Through the end of World 
War II, most maritime powers (the United States and United 
Kingdom in particular) recognized coastal State sovereignty 
only over a three nautical mile band of sea immediately 
adjacent to the coast.105 This included subsea resource 
                                                                                                                                  
 
 
HIGH SEAS, VOLUME I, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/1 (Jan. 11, 1951), 
[hereinafter, Chilean Declaration]. Costa Rica stated that, (“the fishing 
resources and the minerals existing under the submarine shelf, are of 
capital importance for the nation and the State as food and industrial 
wealth.” Maritime Fishing and Hunting Act (Sept. 28 1948), 9 LAWS AND 
REGULATIONS OF THE REGIME OF THE HIGH SEAS, VOLUME I, U.N. Doc. 
ST/LEG/SER.B/1 (Jan. 11, 1951), [hereinafter, Costa Rican Declaration]. 
The Mexican government made a similar point -  “the shelf contains 
natural resources, liquid and gaseous minerals, phosphates, calcium, 
hydrocarbons, etc., of inestimable value whose legal incorporation into 
the national property is urgent and cannot be delayed” Mexican 
Declaration, supra  note 103 at 13; As did Peru, “the shelf contains certain 
natural resources which must be proclaimed as our national heritage,” 
Presidential Decree No. 781 Concerning Submerged Continental or Insular 
Shelf (Aug. 1 1947), 16 LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE REGIME OF THE 
HIGH SEAS, VOLUME I, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/1 (Jan. 11, 1951), 
[hereinafter Peruvian Declaration]. Similar statements were made by a 
variety of Arab States under the Protection of the United Kingdom - “it is 
desirable in the interests of protection, conservation and orderly 
development that the exploitation of such resources should be properly 
limited.” Abu Ilhabi Declaration, supra note 103, at 23. 
105 See, e.g., SAYRE ARCHIE SCHWARTZRAUBER, THE THREE-MILE LIMIT OF 
TERRITORIAL SEAS (1972).  
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rights.106 Examples of subsea resource rights exercised 
beyond three nautical miles were seen as historic, 
prescriptive exceptions (e.g., the British claimed all of Palk 
Bay in present-day Sri Lanka based on uninterrupted 
sovereign claims by local rulers over chank fisheries beyond 
three nautical miles).107 The clearest sign that a change was 
afoot came in 1942, when the United Kingdom and 
Venezuela signed a treaty delimiting jurisdiction over the 
Gulf of Paria. Subsequent to this treaty, both Venezuela and 
the United Kingdom, on behalf of the Colony of Trinidad 
and Tobago, annexed “the submarine areas of the Gulf of 
Paria.”108 Venezuela and the United Kingdom defined this 
submarine area as “the sea-bed and sub-soil outside of the 
territorial waters of the High Contracting Parties.”109 
Proclamation 2667 and the Gulf of Paria documents are 
certainly similar. They both address, for example, the seabed 
and subsoil beyond the territorial sea. But Proclamation 2667 
was definitional insofar as it (1) generalized the claim 
                                                 
 
 
106 An 1858 Act of the British Parliament, for example, affirmed the 
Crown’s right to mines and minerals “under the open Sea below Low-
water Mark” off the coast of Cornwall. An Act to declare and define the 
respective Rights of Her Majesty and of Her Royal Highness the Prince 
of Wales and Duke of Cornwall to the Mines and Minerals in or under 
Land lying below High-water Mark, within and adjacent to the County 
of Cornwall, and for other Purposes 1858, 21 & 22 Vict. C. CIX,  
107 163 Parl Deb HC (5th ser.) (1923) col. 1418 (UK); PHILIP C. JESSUP, THE 
LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICTION 15–16 (1927). 
108 Submarine Areas of the Gulf of Paria (Annexation) Order (Aug. 6 1942), 
Laws of Trinidad and Tobago.  
109 Treaty between His Majesty in respect of the United Kingdom and the 
President of the United States of Venezuela relating to the Submarine 
Areas of the Gulf of Paria, Feb. 26, 1942, U.K.-Venezuela, GR. BRIT. T.S. 
NO. 10 (1942). 
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beyond a specific location (here, the Gulf of Paria), (2) recast 
the claim as one limited to resource rights, (3) extended the 
claim to the entire continental shelf, which previously did 
not have legal character, and (4) made the claim one of 
natural right (i.e., jurisdiction emerged from the continental 
shelf’s appurtenance to the coastal State, and did not require 
a treaty to exist). As the sharp change in subsequent 
international practice will show, these definitional shifts had 
real bite.  
 
c. RESPONSE FROM THE INTERNATIONAL 
COMMUNITY 
 
  At its core, the United States’ rules for the continental 
shelf had three elements: (1) rights beyond the territorial sea 
apply only as to the subsoil and seabed of the continental shelf; 
(2) the coastal State only enjoys jurisdiction and control over 
the continental shelf; and (3) a State is entitled only to the 
natural resources (i.e., gas and minerals) of the continental shelf. 
From 1945 to 1950, ten Arab states (nine of them under 
United Kingdom protection), nine Latin American States, the 
Bahamas (through a United Kingdom Order-in-Council), 
Iceland, and the Philippines all issued unilateral declarations 
on the continental shelf. And while these declarations took 
their inspiration from Proclamation 2667, they proffered 
rules that contradicted each of the three tenets put forth by 
the United States.  
  Geographically disadvantaged States (i.e., those with 
no or a narrow continental shelf) differed from the U.S. rule 
primarily regarding the first tenet. The Saudi Royal 
Pronouncement, for example, does not mention the 
continental shelf. It instead declares that “the subsoil and sea 
bed of those areas of the Persian Gulf seaward from the 
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coastal sea of Saudi Arabia but contiguous to its coasts, are 
declared to appertain to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and to 
be subject to its jurisdiction and control.”110 Abu Dhabi (and 
similarly situated Arab States under the protection of the 
United Kingdom) similarly announced “the right of any 
littoral state to exercise its control over the natural resources 
of the seabed and subsoil adjacent to its coasts.”111 Other 
States were more creative. Chile, for example, laid claim 
only to the continental shelf, but contended that, as a legal 
concept, the continental shelf extended to depths the United 
States considered beyond the pale.112  
  A second group of States asserted that the continental 
shelf was a zone of complete sovereignty, not mere 
jurisdiction and control. This was the position of most Latin 
American States. Argentina, for example, declared that it 
was “the right of each nation to consider as national territory 
                                                 
 
 
110 Saudi Arabian Declaration, supra  note 102, at 22.  
111 Abu Ilhabi Declaration, supra  note 102, at 23.  
112 Chile, for example, declared that, “(1) The Government of Chile 
confirms and proclaims its national sovereignty over all the continental 
shelf adjacent to the continental and island coasts of its national territory, 
whatever may be their depth below the sea”) Chilean Declaration, 6. 
Costa Rica’s law stated that “National sovereignty is confirmed and 
proclaimed in the whole submarine platform or continental and insular 
shelf adjacent to the continental and insular coasts of the national 
territory, at whatever depth it is found,” [emphasis added] Costa Rican 
Declaration, 9. At the time, many geologists understood the continental 
shelf to extend only to the point “where the sea covering the continental 
shelf reaches a depth of 200 meters.” ARTHUR WATTS, THE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 1949-1998 98 (vol. I, 1999). This criteria 
would eventually be incorporated into Article 1 of the Geneva 
Convention on the Continental Shelf. 
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the entire extent of its . . . continental shel[f].”113 Other States 
extended the State’s sovereignty by implication. A United 
Kingdom Order-in-Council, for example, “extend[ed] the 
boundaries of the Colony of the Bahamas so as to include the 
continental shelf contiguous to the coasts of the Colony.”114 
                                                 
 
 
113 Decree No. 14708 Concerning National Sovereignty over the Epicontinental 
Sea and the Argentina Continental Shelf (Oct. 11 1946), 4 LAWS AND 
REGULATIONS OF THE REGIME OF THE HIGH SEAS, VOLUME I, U.N. Doc.  
ST/LEG/SER.B/1 (Jan. 11, 1951), [hereinafter, Argentine Declaration]. 
Other Latin American States to declare sovereignty included Chile - “(1) 
The Government of Chile confirms and proclaims its national 
sovereignty over all the continental shelf adjacent to the continental and 
island coasts of its national territory, whatever may be their depth below 
the sea,” Chilean Declaration, supra  note 105 at 6; Costa Rica - “National 
sovereignty is confirmed and proclaimed in the whole submarine 
platform or continental and insular shelf adjacent to the continental and 
insular coasts of the national territory,” Costa Rican Declaration, supra 
note 105 at 9; Peru – “1. To declare that national sovereignty and 
jurisdiction can be extended to the submerged continental or insular 
shelf adjacent to the continental or insular shores of national territory, 
whatever the depth and extension of this shelf may be,” Peruvian 
Declaration, supra note 104 at 16.  
114 Also note provision from Honduras, “Article 4. ‘The limits of 
Honduras and its territorial division shall be determined by law. The 
submarine platform or continental and insular shelf, and the waters 
which cover it, in both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, at whatever 
depth it may be found and whatever its extent may be, forms a part of 
the national territory,” Congressional Decree No. 102 Amending the Political 
Constitution (March 7 1950), 11 LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE REGIME OF 
THE HIGH SEAS, VOLUME I, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/1 (Jan. 11, 1951), 
[hereinafter Honduran Declaration]; Nicaragua – “Article 5. The national 
territory. . . also comprises . . . the continental shelf, the submerged 
foundations (zocalos submarinos), the air space and the stratosphere,” 
Political Constitution (Nov. 1 1950), 15 LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF THE 
REGIME OF THE HIGH SEAS, VOLUME I, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/1 (Jan. 
11, 1951), [hereinafter, Nicaraguan Declaration]; and Panama – “Article 
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By leaving the precise legal status of the continental shelf 
more ambiguous, these pronouncements presaged the 
compromise that would eventually be codified in UNCLOS 
(i.e., that a coastal State exercised “sovereign rights” only as 
to the resources of the continental shelf). 
  Lastly, a number of States asserted that rights to the 
continental shelf extended to the living resources in the 
above water column. Some went so far as to claim 
sovereignty over the superjacent water column, extending 
their territorial reach many hundreds of miles beyond the 
three nautical mile limit preferred by major maritime 
powers. Chile, for example, proclaimed sovereignty “over 
the adjacent seas within the limits necessary to preserve . . . 
the natural riches belonging to them.”115 Similar declarations 
were made by Argentina,116 Costa Rica,117 Honduras,118 
                                                                                                                                  
 
 
209. The following belong to the State and are of public use . . . (4) The 
aerial space and the submarine continental shelf which appertain to the 
national territory,” Constitution (March 1 1946), 15 LAWS AND 
REGULATIONS OF THE REGIME OF THE HIGH SEAS, VOLUME I, U.N. Doc. 
ST/LEG/SER.B/1 (Jan. 11, 1951), [hereinafter, Panamanian Declaration].  
115 Chilean Declaration, supra  note 104, at 6.  
116 Argentina Declaration, supra note 113, at 5.  
117 “Article 2. The rights and interests of Costa Rica are proclaimed over 
the seas adjacent to the continental and insular coasts of the national 
territory, whatever their depth, and to the extent necessary to protect, 
conserve, and utilize the natural resources and wealth which exist or 
shall come to exist on, in, or under said seas,” Costa Rican Declaration, 
supra  note 104, at 10. 
118 “The submarine platform or continental and insular shelf, and the 
waters which cover it, in both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, at 
whatever depth it may be found and whatever its extent may be, forms a 
part of the national territory,” Honduran Declaration, supra note 114, at 
11. 
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Panama,119 and Peru.120 These more extensive claims were 
based on an interest, shared with countries like Iceland, in 
preserving near-abroad fish stocks for domestic use.121 The 
United States and other maritime powers, which depended 
more heavily on far-seas fishing, naturally resisted this 
extension of authority.   
  Taken together, this ferment of conflicting rules bear 
out two of my theoretic conclusions. First, unintended 
consequences are an important aspect of regime formation. 
While Washington could not have foreseen the myriad ways 
in which other States might leverage its redefinition of the 
continental shelf, it was foreseeable that the nascent rules 
would be contested. Second, States fully understand that 
rules are inherently political, and work vigorously to 
advance rules that best accord with their national interests. 
By 1950, for example, the United States had demarched 
                                                 
 
 
119 “Article 3. For the purposes of fisheries in general, national jurisdiction 
over the territorial waters of the Republic extends to all the space above 
the sea bed of the submarine continental shelf,” Panamanian Declaration, 
supra note 114, at 16.  
120 “2. National sovereignty and jurisdiction are to be extended over the 
sea adjoining the shores of national territory whatever its depth and in 
the extension necessary to reserve, protect, maintain and utilize natural 
resources and wealth of any kind which may be found in or below those 
waters,” Peruvian Declaration, supra  note 104, at 17. 
121 ROTHWELL & STEPHENS, supra note 98, at 10; see also, “Article 1. The 
Ministry of Fisheries shall issue regulations establishing explicitly 
bounded conservation zones within the limits of the continental shelf of 
Iceland, wherein all fisheries shall be subject to Icelandic rules and 
control,” Iceland Law No. 44 Concerning the Scientific Conservation of the 
Continental Shelf Fisheries (April 5 1948), 12 LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF 
THE REGIME OF THE HIGH SEAS, VOLUME I, U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/1 
(Jan. 11, 1951). 
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Chile, Argentina, Peru, and Saudi Arabia, objecting to what 
it saw as rules “unsupported by accepted principles of 
international law.”122  
  The period from 1950 to 1958 saw the proliferation of 
agents contesting for supremacy in the creation of an 
international regime for the continental shelf. The 
International Law Commission, for example, was called 
upon to draft proposals for the codification of a State’s right 
to the continental shelf. The Commission did not engage in a 
passive reflection of lex lata (the law as it currently exists). 
The Commission rapporteur, JPA Francois, for example, 
contended that, “It was more difficult to amend a law that 
had already been established by States, than to guide it into 
the desired channel by the enunciation of certain rules and 
principles.”123 The Commission was quite successful in this 
regard. Articles 67 and 68 of its 1956 report to the General 
Assembly became, verbatim, Articles 1 and 2(1) of the 1958 
Geneva Convention. These Articles provided, respectively, 
that (1) the continental shelf extended to a depth of 200 
                                                 
 
 
122 Regarding Chile, Argentina, and Peru, the United States objected to 
proclamations of “national sovereignty . . . over the continental shelf and 
over the seas adjacent to the coast” given that they fail “with respect to 
fishing, to accord appropriate and adequate recognition of the rights and 
interests of the United States in the high seas off the coast”) JOHN NOYES, 
ERIK FRANCKX, & KRISTEN JURAS, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF 
THE SEA 519 (2d ed., 2014). Regarding Saudi Arabia, the United States 
objected to “All provisions to the effect that the coastal sea, i.e., the 
marginal sea, of the Kingdom extends seaward of a belt of three nautical 
miles along its coast or around its islands,” ALI A. EL-HAKIM, THE 
MIDDLE EASTERN STATES AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 215 (1979).  
123 Int’l Law Comm’n, Yearbook Vol. I: Law of the sea – regime of the 
high seas 66th Plenary Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SR.66, at 215, (July 
12 1950).  
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meters or where “the depth of the superjacent waters admits 
of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas” 
and (2) “The coastal State exercises . . . sovereign rights for 
the purpose of exploring [the continental shelf] and 
exploiting its resources.”124 It’s not that these provisions 
were uncontested. Many States, including the United States, 
objected to the International Law Commission’s 
formulations during the Geneva Convention negotiations.125 
But a combination of being the first to get a crack at devising 
a compromise text, as well as accurately understanding the 
verbiage States on both sides would be willing to accept, 
                                                 
 
 
124 Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the International Law Commission 
covering the work of its eighth session, 23 April-4 July 1956, U.N. Doc. 
A/3159, at 296–97 (Nov. 1956). 
125 See, e.g., statements by Argentina - “it was a pity that the Commission 
was reluctant to accept the principle of sovereignty of the coastal State 
over the continental shelf,” U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, 
Official Records Volume VI Fourth Committee (Continental Shelf) Summary 
records of meetings and Annexes, 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.13/42; China  - 
“the term ‘sovereign rights’ in article 68 should be replaced by ‘rights of 
control and jurisdiction’”) Id., at 4; Denmark - “it would prefer the words 
‘sovereign rights’ in article 68 to be replaced by ‘control and jurisdiction’; 
any reference to sovereignty, even if followed by a restrictive clause, 
might cause difficulties during international armed conflicts or with 
regard to scientific research”) Id., at 13; Chile – “the best course would be 
to recognize the sovereignty of the coastal State over the continental shelf 
and then attempt to specify the status of the superjacent waters,” Id., at 
16; Italy - “it was incorrect to speak of the coastal State exercising 
sovereign rights over the continental shelf, as did article 68,” Id.; United 
States - “In order to make it clear that the waters above the continental 
shelf were not affected, the United States delegation would like to see the 
word ‘sovereign’ deleted, while agreeing to the retention of the word 
‘rights’,” Id., at 20.  
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powerfully affected the final regime that, largely, exists 
today.  
 
d. TAKEAWAYS: THE CONTINENTAL SHELF AND 
CRITICAL REALISM 
  
   In the end, how well were United States interests 
served by unilaterally asserting jurisdiction and control over 
the continental shelf in 1945? By almost any metric, very 
well. The regime for the continental shelf was restricted to 
the subsoil and seabed of the ocean floor. Tellingly, 
Proclamation 2667 did not provide precise boundaries for 
the extent of the continental shelf, which over time changed 
with improved technology. Coastal State rights were 
restricted to natural resources, which included mineral and 
non-living resources as well as “sedentary species.” This is 
largely in line with the original proclamation, which 
suggested that a State only had rights to petroleum and 
minerals. And codified international law came to reject the 
contention that a State exercises sovereignty over the 
continental shelf.126  
  From a theoretic perspective, we can identify all four 
of our critical realist causes in this story. A contest of 
interests characterized the entire regime-building process, 
motivating States to advance or stymie the rules first 
proffered by the United States (final cause). The United 
States, as the predominant maritime power throughout this 
period, had significant capacity to induce other States to 
                                                 
 
 
126 Any difference one might impute into “sovereign rights” versus 
“jurisdiction and control” has mattered little insofar as the actual practice 
of States is concerned. 
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accept its version of the rule (material cause). It is important 
to note, however, that military might did not allow 
Washington to impose its view on other States (or even the 
International Law Commission). The United States actively 
engaged with other States after the Proclamation was issued, 
objecting to practices that were contrary to its interests and 
actively participating in negotiations leading up to the 1958 
Geneva Convention (effective cause). Finally, and most 
importantly, the United States redefined a geographical 
entity that, previously, had little monetary or security value. 
None of the subsequent jockeying over language or 
particular interests would have mattered without that first, 
crucial step.  
  We can derive three policy lessons from this case 
study. First, rules are not created in a vacuum. The 
Proclamation’s ingenuity was in its ability to harness 
opportunities presented by changing technology and 
recasting preexisting international practice to better accord 
with U.S. national interests. Exceptional entitlements to 
chank beds and the division of the seabed in the Gulf of 
Paria could easily have been recast in terms of absolute 
sovereignty over the continental shelf (ala Chile, Argentina, 
etc.). Second, domestic legal action does not need to apply to 
extraterritorial agents to have an international effect or to 
create an international regime. The Proclamation does not 
purport to bind any entity other than the United States, 
although all exercises of jurisdiction are necessarily 
exclusionary. Policymakers should not cabin themselves, 
therefore, to policy solutions that focus on effective 
causation (i.e., acting directly on other agents). Finally, 
domestic action was only the opening gambit in a whole-of-
government approach to regime creation. The United States 
paired domestic legal action with a robust campaign of 
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international engagement, ranging from bilateral demarches 
to participation in formal, international negotiations. This 
multi-pronged strategy is essential when there is more lead-
time between domestic action and international codification, 
as will be seen in the case of international corruption.    
e. BRIBERY OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS 
 
  The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) was 
enacted by President Jimmy Carter in 1977, and was the first 
piece of domestic legislation to criminalize giving bribes to 
foreign officials. It was followed 20 years later by the 
OECD’s Anti-Bribery Convention and the United Nations’ 
Convention Against Corruption (CAC) in 2003. Since 2003, a 
number of States have enacted domestic anti-bribery statutes 
in furtherance of these international obligations. For our 
purposes, this has most notably included the United 
Kingdom’s 2010 Bribery Act.  
  This section will trace the causal chain from 
Watergate, through the FCPA, to the modern, increasingly 
dense international anti-bribery regime. This history will 
show the active role that Congress can play in creating 
international legal regimes and the utility of pairing 
domestic action with international engagement.  
 
f. From Watergate to the FCPA 
 
  In the widening wake of Watergate, Senator Frank 
Church led a less well-known Subcommittee on 
Multinational Corporations that investigated U.S. corporate 
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political contributions to foreign governments.127 The 
subcommittee’s investigations sparked a series of revelations 
that seriously destabilized governments friendly to the 
United States. Many of the earliest revelations centered 
around Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, an important 
American defense manufacturer. The Italian Communist 
Party, for example, almost came to power after it was 
discovered that the former Chief of the Italian Air Force 
received $1.6 million in bribes from Lockheed.128 Japanese 
Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka was forced to step down, and 
subsequently arrested, for accepting $1.7 million from 
Lockheed.129 Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands, consort of 
the Queen, had to resign his official posts after receiving $1.1 
million in Lockheed payoffs.130 But Lockheed was far from 
the only American corporation that bribed foreign officials. 
By 1977, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) had 
uncovered 300 instances in which U.S. companies bribed 
foreign officials, to the tune of at least $300 million.131 Gulf 
                                                 
 
 
127 David Leigh & Rob Evans, The Lockheed scandal, THE GUARDIAN (June 
8, 2007), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/jun/08/bae35.  
128 Italians Arrest An Ex-Air Chief, N.Y. TIMES (March 23, 1976), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1976/03/23/archives/italians-arrest-an-
exair-chief-general-fanali-charged-in-lockheed.html; Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act: Hearings on H.R. 3815 and H.R. 1602, before the Subcommittee 
on Consumer Protection and Finance of the Committee on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong. 173 (1977) (statement of Representative 
Stephen Solarz).   
129 Japan Arrests 17th Official in Lockheed Bribe Scandal, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 21, 
1976), http://www.nytimes.com/1976/08/21/archives/japan-arrests-
17th-official-in-the-lockheed-bribe-scandal.html. 
130 Hearings on H.R. 3815, supra note 128, at 172.  
131 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Hearings on S. 305, before the Comm. on 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong. 1 (1977) (opening 
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Oil, for example, illegally contributed $4 million to the ruling 
South Korean Democratic Republican Party’s campaign war 
chest.132 General Telephone lost out on an Indonesian 
telecommunications contract after the Hughes Aircraft 
Company, allegedly, agreed to pay $40 million in bribes.133  
  These reports led to a widespread belief that the 
public was loosing faith in American capitalism. Senator 
William Proxmire, for example, stated that, “Public 
confidence in the business community, the heart of our free 
enterprise system, has been seriously affected by these 
revelations.”134 Secretary of the Treasury Michael 
Blumenthal attested that, “the Carter Administration 
                                                                                                                                  
 
 
statement of Senator Proxmire). The exact amount of money tendered in 
bribes is disputed. Professor Nicholas Wilfson, in his Statement before 
the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, testified 
that, “More than 300 corporations have admitted to the payment of more 
than $400,000,000 in questionable payments.” Id., 215. On the other end 
of the spectrum, Representative Robert Eckhardt, Chairman of the House 
Subcommittee on Consumer Protection and Finance of the Committee on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, stated that, “Since 1974, 
approximately 200 American corporations have admitted making 
questionable foreign payments exceeding $300 million.” Hearings on H.R. 
3815, supra note 128 at 1. Notwithstanding these numerical discrepancies, 
the scale of this corruption is striking ($300 million in 1977 was 
approximately $1.2 billion in 2017). 
132 Hearings on H.R. 3815 (statement of Dr. Gordon Adams), supra note 
128, at 28.  
133 Seymour Hersh, Hughes Aircraft Faces Allegation that it Used Bribery in 
Indonesia, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1977. Hughes Aircraft Company denied the 
allegations. The Export-Import Bank, a U.S. Government entity, 
eventually provided $50 million in guaranteed loans to Hughes “despite 
knowledge of the allegations of a payoff and conducted no inquiry into 
the allegations.” Id.  
134 Hearings on S. 305, supra note 131, at 1.  
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believes that it is damaging both to our country and to a 
healthy world economic system for American corporations 
to bribe foreign officials.”135 Revelations of untoward 
corporate conduct generated other domestic and foreign 
policy concerns. SEC Chairman Roderick Hills wrote that 
bribery’s greatest ill was “the defiance or circumvention of 
the system of corporate accountability on which the 
securities laws – and indeed our system of mass capital 
formation – rest.”136 Representative Michael Harrington 
noted how “Both Chilean President Allende and Venezuelan 
President Perez broke off talks with U.S. officials on 
compensation for nationalized property when they learned 
of corporate payments.”137 
  These domestic and international policy concerns 
motivated the Senate and House to pass the FCPA by the 
end of 1977. For our purposes, the FCPA has three relevant 
parts. Section 102 mandated accounting practices such that 
publicly traded corporations would have internal accounting 
controls sufficient “to provide reasonable assurances” that 
transactions are executed pursuant management’s general or 
specific authorization.138 Sections 103 and 104 provide that 
                                                 
 
 
135 Id., at 67.  
136 Id., at 121.  
137 Hearings on H.R. 3815, supra note 129, at 169.  
138 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (“(2) 
Every issuer which has a class of securities registered pursuant to section 
12 of this title and every issuer which is required to file reports pursuant 
to section 15(d) of this title shall— (A) make and keep books, records, 
and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the 
transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer; and (B) devise 
and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to 
provide reasonable assurances that— (i) transactions are executed in 
accordance with management’s general or specific authorizations”).  
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publicly traded corporations and other U.S. “domestic 
concerns,” respectively, would not provide bribes to foreign 
officials, political parties, or other persons when there is 
reason to know that all or part of the bribe would be 
conveyed to a foreign official, political party, or candidate.139 
                                                 
 
 
139 More specifically, both §103 and §104 provided that it is unlawful “to 
make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate 
commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, 
or authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to 
give, or authorization of the giving of anything of value to— (1) any 
foreign official for purposes of— (A) influencing any act or decision of 
such foreign official in his official capacity, including a decision to fail to 
perform his official functions; or (B) inducing such foreign official to use 
his influence with a foreign government or instrumentality thereof to 
affect or influence any act or decision of such government or 
instrumentality, in order to assist . . . in obtaining or retaining business 
for or with, or directing business to, any person; (2) any foreign political 
party or official thereof or any candidate for foreign political office for 
purposes of— (A) influencing any act or decision of such party, official, 
or candidate in its or his official capacity, including a decision to fail to 
perform its or his official functions; or (B) inducing such party, official, or 
candidate to use its or his influence with a foreign government or 
instrumentality thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of such 
government or instrumentality, in order to assist . . . in obtaining or 
retaining business for or with, or directing business to, any person; or (3) 
any person, while knowing or having reason to know that all or a 
portion of such money or thing of value will be offered, given, or 
promised, directly or indirectly, to any foreign official, to any foreign 
political party or official thereof, or to any candidate for foreign political 
office.” Id.  
Foreign officials include “any officer or employee of a foreign 
government or any department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or 
any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of such 
government or department, agency, or instrumentality. Such term does 
not include any employee of a foreign government or any department, 
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Congress recognized that the FCPA would both extend to 
non-U.S. citizens and have extraterritorial reach. The 
conference report, for example, states that “the conferees 
determined that foreign nationals or residents otherwise 
under the jurisdiction of the United States would be covered 
by the bill in circumstances where an issuer [of stock] or 
domestic concern engaged in conduct proscribed by the 
bill.”140 Similarly, the House Report noted that the definition 
of “domestic concern” was constructed such that it would 
“reach not only all U.S. companies other than those subject 
to SEC jurisdiction, but also foreign subsidiaries of any U.S. 
corporation.”141 This is, of course, in addition to the fact that 
companies publicly traded on U.S. exchanges do not 
necessarily have their principal place of business in the 
United States.142  
  The FCPA, however, was always understood to be 
one prong of a multidimensional strategy for combating 
                                                                                                                                  
 
 
agency, or instrumentality thereof whose duties are primarily ministerial 
or clerical.” Ibid., §103A(b) 
Domestic concerns are defined as “(A) any individual who is a citizen, 
national, or resident of the United States; or (B) any corporation, 
partnership, association, joint-stock company, business trust, 
unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship which has its 
principal place of business in the United States, or which is organized 
under the laws of a State of the United States or a territory, possession, or 
commonwealth of the United States” Id., §104(d). 
140 H.R. Rep. No. 95-831, at 14 (1977) (Conf. Rep.).   
141 Hearings on H.R. 3815, supra note 129, at 12.  
142 In 2015, for example, 923 non-U.S. companies representing 53 
jurisdictions filed reports with the SEC due to their listing on U.S. 
exchanges. U.S. SECURITY AND EXCHANGE COMM’N, MARKET SUMMARY 
(2015), 
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/internatl/companies.shtml. 
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bribery of government officials. President Carter’s signing 
statement noted that “These efforts . . . can only be 
successful in combating bribery and extortion if other 
countries and business itself take comparable action. 
Therefore, I hope progress will continue in the United 
Nations toward the negotiation of a treaty on illicit 
payments.”143 Secretary Blumenthal was more specific in 
testimony before the Senate. He noted that the Carter 
Administration had proposed a treaty that would (1) enforce 
a State’s criminal laws, (2) facilitate information exchanges to 
aid enforcement, and (3) provide uniform disclosure 
requirements.144 Blumenthal also highlighted the 1976 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, which, 
though non-enforceable, stated that corporations should not 
render bribes to public officials.145 The U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce and National Association of Manufacturers, 
though unsupportive of the FCPA, echoed these calls for 
international negotiations.146 More interestingly, certain U.S. 
                                                 
 
 
143 Jimmy Carter, Signing Statement, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=7036. 
144 Hearing on S. 305 (statement by Sen. Blumenthal), supra note 131 at 69.  
145 Hearing on S. 305 (Sen. Blumenthal colloquy with Sen. Tower), supra 
note 131 at 103.  
146 Hearing on S. 305 (U.S. Chamber of Commerce statement for the 
record), supra note 131 at 187 (“The Chamber endorses the efforts of the 
U.S. Government to bring about a treaty in this area under the auspices 
of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)”); Id. 
(National Association of Manufacturers statement for the record), 208 
(“The negotiation of an international agreement to eliminate improper 
payments worldwide would help assure that U.S. industry is not placed 
at a competitive disadvantage by unfair foreign practices as well as place 
world commerce on a better, market oriented trade and investment 
basis”).  
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Government officials were quite strategic about how the 
FCPA might be leveraged internationally. Senator Harrison 
Williams, for example, argued that “An affirmative action by 
our Government will facilitate, what I believe is generally 
agreed is necessary, an international solution. Once the bill 
becomes law our Government will be in a position to argue 
forcefully, with integrity and credibility, for bilateral and 
multilateral agreements.”147 SEC Chairman Roderick Hills 
similarly noted that, “If we had treaties executed with the 
Germans, Dutch, Italians, Japanese, the other major 
industrial countries, we could practically, it seems to me, 
wipe out the temptation to substitute competitive bribery for 
fair competition.”148  
 
g. The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention and 
Beyond 
 
 These statements turned out to be quite prescient, albeit 
two decades too early. In the intervening years, American 
industry became convinced that the FCPA, as a unilateral 
measure, was hurting its international competitiveness. 
President Bill Clinton suggested as much in a letter to the 
Senate, “Since the enactment in 1977 of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act (FCPA), the United States has been alone in 
specifically criminalizing the business-related bribery of 
foreign public officials.”149 This frustration had first peaked 
                                                 
 
 
147 Hearing on S. 305, supra note 131, at 2.  
148 Id. at 114.  
149 Message from the President of the United States Transmitting 
Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Officials in International 
Business Transactions, Adopted At Paris on November 21, 1997, by a 
Conference held under the Auspices of the Organization for Economic 
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in 1988, when Congress directed the executive to more 
actively pursue an OECD convention against bribery 
modeled after the FCPA.150 Three factors appear to have 
motivated a change in European and Japanese positions 
against such action. First, American business, led by General 
Electric’s General Counsel Fritz Heimann, organized 
Transparency International to reshape the international 
conversation around bribery.151 The United States, even in 
the early days of the post-Cold War era, was limited in the 
extent to which it could name and shame corporations 
closely linked to its alliance networks in Europe and Asia. 
Second, a series of domestic political scandals in Europe 
mobilized domestic audiences to be more accepting of an 
international, supply-side bribery treaty.152 Lastly, 
capitalizing on these revelations, reports indicate that the 
Clinton Administration had threatened to publicly disclose 
the names of OECD corporations that had engaged in 
bribery.153 
  It is remarkable how similar the Bribery Convention 
is to the FCPA, notwithstanding the fact that they are 
separated by over two decades. The State Department’s 
                                                                                                                                  
 
 
Cooperation and Development (OECD). Convention Signed in Paris on 
December 17, 1997, by the United States and 32 Other Nations, Treaty 
Doc 105-43, 105th Cong. (1998), III [hereinafter, Letter of Transmittal]. 
150 Id.  
151 Elizabeth Spahn, Implementing Global Anti-Bribery Norms: from the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention to the 
U.N. Convention Against Corruption, 1 INDIANA INT‘L & COMP. L. REV. 23 
(2013): 4-5; Edmund Andrews, 29 Nations Agree to Outlaw Bribing Foreign 
Officials: Ratification is Required, THE NEW YORK TIMES, (Nov. 21, 1997).  
152 Spahn, supra note 151, at 6.  
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Letter of Submittal for the Bribery Convention identifies 
only three points of departure, two of which actually went 
beyond the FCPA’s requirements. First, the OECD 
Convention covers bribes by “any person” not just issuers of 
securities or directors of “domestic concerns.”154 This 
required the United States to expand its jurisdiction to 
include foreign nationals in the United States, as well as U.S. 
citizens operating outside the United States.155 Second, 
Article 1(4) of the OECD Convention expands the definition 
of foreign public officials to include “any official or agent of 
a public international organization,” incorporating 
supranational organs like the European Community into the 
anti-bribery framework.156 The only substantive way in 
which the OECD Convention did not meet FCPA standards 
related to foreign political parties or party officials. In many 
OECD countries, foreign contributions to domestic political 
                                                 
 
 
154 Letter of Transmittal, supra note 150, at VI (“to comply fully with the 
Convention, which covers bribes by ‘any person,’ the United States will 
have to expand the scope of the FCPA to encompass bribes paid by 
foreign persons who are not affiliated with issuers that have securities 
registered under the Exchange Act”). 
155 Id., at VII (“To implement fully the Convention, the United States will 
have to expand the FCPA to encompass acts within its territory by other 
foreign persons. The United States also proposes to assert jurisdiction 
over the acts of U.S. persons outside the United States.”). 
156 Id., at VI (Paragraph 17 of the Commentaries notes that public 
international organizations “include[]any international organization 
formed by states, governments, or other public international 
organizations, including a regional economic integration organization 
such as the European Community. The FCPA does not cover bribery of 
officials of ‘public international organizations.’”). 
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parties continue to be legal.157 The State Department noted, 
however, that the Convention covers “business-related 
bribes to foreign public officials made through political 
parties or party officials, as well as bribes directed by 
corrupt foreign public officials to political parties or party 
officials.”158  
  Additional steps have been taken to strengthen this 
nascent international anti-bribery regime since the OECD 
Convention entered into force in 2009. The United Nations 
CAC, for example, entered into force in 2005, focusing on 
demand-side prohibitions of corruption.159 183 countries are 
States-Parties to the CAC, though enforcement of its 
provisions varies widely. In 2010 the United Kingdom 
passed the Bribery Act, which in certain respects imposes 
even stricter anti-bribery requirements than the FCPA.  For 
example, the Act prohibits facilitation payments, meaning 
that money paid to government clerical staff to expedite 
paperwork would also be prohibited.160 
   
                                                 
 
 
157 For example, it was only in 2017 that Australia began to consider 
legislation prohibiting foreign donations to political parties. Jonathan 
Pearlman, Australia bans foreign donations to political parties 
after+China+controversy,+THE+TELEGRAPH+(Dec.+5,+2017), 
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h. TAKEAWAYS: ANTI-BRIBERY AND CRITICAL 
REALISM 
 
  Unlike the continental shelf, U.S. policymakers were 
better attuned to the fact that the FCPA could lay the 
foundation for an international anti-bribery regime. Dr. 
Gordon Adams, Director of Military Research at the Council 
on Economic Priorities, testified during a House hearing 
that, “One purpose of [the FCPA] is to set an example which 
other countries will hopefully follow.”161 Dr. Adams also 
argued that the FCPA would allow “the U.S. Government . . 
. participating in international talks on this issue [to have] a 
clear, strong policy opposing such practices, giving it a 
leadership position rather than that of being a reluctant 
participant.”162 The critical realist framework allows us to 
more fully appreciate the causal mechanisms that allowed 
the United States to be so successful in crafting an 
international anti-bribery regime.  
  From the perspective of material causation, we must 
acknowledge the extent to which the United States’ 
economic supremacy, particularly in the immediate 
aftermath of the Cold War, allowed it to instantiate anti-
bribery rules. In 1977, when the FCPA was adopted, U.S. 
GDP was more than twice that of Japan, the second largest 
economy at the time, and nearly four times that of Germany, 
the third largest economy.163 Nearly exactly the same was 
                                                 
 
 
161 Hearings on H.R. 3815, supra note 129, at 37.  
162 Id.  
163 WORLD BANK, Data, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=2016&l
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true in 1998 when the Bribery Convention was adopted.164 
United States dominance in terms of market capitalization is 
even more striking. In 1977 the market capitalization of U.S. 
listed domestic companies was almost 1.5 times greater than 
that of all other countries for which the World Bank 
currently has data.165 By 1998 it still just exceeded that of all 
other countries combined.166 In terms of capitalization, 
liquidity, and diversification, U.S. stock markets are 
consistently the most attractive for public corporations 
seeking to raise capital.167 This structural supremacy aided 
the United States, here, in two ways. First, it extended the 
FCPA’s reach, since amending the Securities Exchange Act 
allowed anti-bribery prohibitions and accounting standards 
to be applied to all firms publicly traded in the United 
States. The FCPA would have been much less influential if 
American stock exchanges were less important 
internationally. Second, financial supremacy gave the United 
States more leverage in creating international rules. Even 
amongst OECD countries, the United States far outstripped 
any other State in terms of economic prowess. The material 
cause, therefore, significantly explains why the United States 
was able to craft an international anti-bribery regime that 
accorded with its interests.  
                                                 
 
 
164 WORLD BANK, Data, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?end=2016&l
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167 Why the U.S. Market, CHARLES SCHWAB, 
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  The FCPA was less of a revolutionary, definitional act 
(formal causation) than Proclamation 2667 on the continental 
shelf. Even in 1977, many States had laws against bribery, 
and popular opposition to corruption were widely shared in 
a variety of States. Instead, the FCPA acted as a formal cause 
of the current international anti-bribery regime in two, more 
limited ways. First, it recast the fight against corruption as a 
supply-side problem. While criminal prohibitions on 
receiving bribes were relatively commonplace, States had 
not previously contemplated criminalizing giving bribes. 
This freed up a degree of extraterritorial enforcement that 
would not have been possible if corruption were only be to 
understood as a demand-side problem. It would be a stark 
imposition against comity for the United States, for example, 
to exert jurisdiction over a foreign government official 
accused of taking bribes. Indicting the U.S. held company 
that provided the bribe, however, less directly threatens 
another State’s sovereignty. Second, the FCPA as a text 
provided an outline for the OECD Convention. As 
evidenced by the State Department’s Letter of Submittal, the 
OECD Convention was so similar in substance that few U.S. 
domestic legislative changes were needed.  
 The effective and final causes of the OECD Convention are 
readily apparent from statements made on the record both 
in 1977 and 1998. Both the executive and legislative branches 
were explicit in their desire to persuade European and Asian 
allies to adopt U.S. anti-bribery rules. Non-State agents also 
played a role – Transparency International and the American 
business community more broadly were essential in 
pressuring the U.S. Government to force international action 
and shaming other States where bribery was taken less 
seriously. Indications that the Clinton Administration was 
willing to disclose unsavory deals in OECD member States 
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shows the extent to which coercion played an integral role in 
the creation of the anti-bribery regime. The final causes 
(national interests) underlying these rules are also clear. 
Congress wanted to restore faith in capitalist systems and 
create a level playing field, based on quality and actual price, 
for economic competition. The lack of normative 
contestation between States over the U.S. rules may indicate 
that many developed States were aligned in pursuing these 
interests. In this regard, the New York Bar Association may 
have been proven correct when it wrote that, “Because the 
membership of the OECD is comprised of only Western 
developed countries, it has the advantage of making it easier 
to achieve consensus among its members.”168 
  Policymakers today can extract five lessons from the 
FCPA. First, Congress has a role to play in creating 
international legal regimes. The FCPA originated in 
revelations stemming from the Church Subcommittee, and 
its language was largely drafted by members of Congress. 
Legislators, therefore, should think broadly as to the possible 
international effects of even domestically oriented bills. 
Second, the executive should think critically about how 
international policies can be coordinated with domestic 
action. From the beginning, the FCPA was understood to be 
only one part of a whole-of-government strategy to combat 
global corruption. Promised international action helped 
assuage domestic concerns that U.S. firms would be 
disadvantaged by the FCPA. By the same token, the FCPA’s 
existence allowed the United States to better publicly 
pressure other OECD States and impose anti-bribery rules 
on non-U.S. firms listed on American exchanges. Third, and 
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relatedly, policymakers should think of cross-national 
linkages as an element of national power. Here, the fact that 
the United States was a financial nexus for multinational 
corporations allowed the FCPA to have outsized 
international effect. Non-State agents can be powerful 
conduits of domestic rules to other jurisdictions, creating 
expectations about rules of the road that become sticky, or at 
least the basis for international negotiations. Similarly, 
fourth, venue matters. Given the unequal global distribution 
of economic power, a United Nations treaty on supply-side 
bribery was less important than a convention between States 
that account for the lion’s share of international economic 
activity. Of course, this does not discount the importance of 
universally shared standards – China, for example, is not a 
party to the Bribery Convention and accounts for a 
substantial and increasing share of global investment. Lastly, 
unilateral domestic action can be costly. By the late 1980s 
there was a consensus in the business community that 
unilateral adherence to the FCPA made U.S. firms less 
competitive.169 Rules, if adhered to, necessarily limit the 
universe of possible actions that agents may permissibly 
undertake. This imposes costs, which must be internalized 
by some agent either domestically or internationally. 
Policymakers need to balance these costs, and the 
                                                 
 
 
169 Note that some empirical research has tended to show that while 
bribery may help win foreign contracts, it does not increase profits. 
Daniel Fisher, Corporate Bribery May Bring In The Business, But 
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distribution of cost, against the prospective gains to be had 
in eventually crafting an international legal regime.    
 
IV. MODERN CHALLENGES: DATA PRIVACY AND 
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
 
  The pace of technological change has only quickened 
since regimes for the continental shelf and bribery were 
developed in the 20th century. These technological 
revolutions create new issues for which rules must be 
applied. The two most pressing manifestations of this 
phenomenon concern digital privacy and AI. In both, States 
have already, or soon will, enact domestic rules that, 
through the same causal mechanisms seen above, begin to 
constitute international legal regimes.  
  Take, for example, the European Union (EU)’s 
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). First, a 
methodological note. Unlike our previous cases, the UE is a 
supranational organization. As such, the GDPR story is 
necessarily more complicated than that of the FCPA or 
Proclamation 2667.170 The fact that the EU is constituted 
differently than the U.S. as an agent in international politics, 
however, does not change the causal story presented here. 
The GDPR creates an EU-wide set of standards for the 
protection of personal data relating to online or real world 
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State data privacy antecedents to EU-wide data protection (e.g., the fact 
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behavior conducted in the EU.171 Importantly, these 
standards apply to the personal data of EU internet users 
regardless of the location of the entity holding their data. In 
this sense, the standards have significant extraterritorial 
reach.172 The GDPR defines personal data as “information 
relating to an identified or identifiable natural person.”173 
This understanding of personal data goes well beyond what 
is protected under U.S. law, to include IP address, device ID, 
and customer reference number.174 Additionally, the GDPR 
imposes restrictions on transferring personal data outside of 
the EU. Data may only be transferred if (1) the European 
Commission determines that the receiving jurisdiction 
“ensures an adequate level of protection” consistent with the 
GDPR,175 (2) the processing entity has provided 
“appropriate safeguards,”176 or (3) the individual concerned 
has provided specific consent for the transfer.177 
Furthermore, the GDPR guarantees a number of privacy 
rights to EU internet users, including mandatory, prompt 
notification of data breaches likely to “result in a risk for the 
                                                 
 
 
171 EU General Data Protection Regulation – Key Changes, DLA PIPER, 
https://www.dlapiper.com/en/us/focus/eu-data-protection-
regulation/key-changes/.  
172 Frequently Asked Questions about the incoming GDPR, GDPR PORTAL, 
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173 General Data Protection Regulation 2016 O.J. (L119/1), Art 4(1) 
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lawyer-warns-of-heavy-burden-from-europes-new-privacy-rules/.  
175 GDPR, supra note 173, Art 45. 
176 Id., at Art 46. 
177 Id., at Art 49. 
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rights and freedoms of individuals,” access to one’s personal 
data, the ability to instruct an entity to erase one’s personal 
data (consistent with the “right to be forgotten”), and the 
ability to move one’s personal data from one processing 
entity to another.178 Together, these rights are at the heart of 
the regulation’s purpose—to give citizens control over their 
personal data.” 
  These rules, of course, have historical precedents. The 
GDPR builds on a long history of European concern about 
data privacy dating back to the OECD’s 1980 Guidelines on 
the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal 
Data.179 The Guidelines, for example, similarly define 
personal data as “any information relating to an identified or 
identifiable individual.”180 Importantly, however, the 
Guidelines are explicit in their concern about the effect of 
national privacy laws on transborder data flows. The 
Guidelines’ preface, for example, recommends, “that 
Member countries endeavour to remove or avoid creating, in 
the name of privacy protection, unjustified obstacles to 
transborder flows of personal data.”181 One year later, the 
Council of Europe successfully negotiated the Convention 
for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
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Processing of Personal Data, which codified many of the 
OECD’s recommendations.182 There were hints, however, 
that the EU was already gradually subverting some of the 
OECD Guidelines’ business-friendly provisions. The 1981 
Convention, for example, only provided that Member States 
not impede the flow of personal data as between Member 
States in the name of privacy.183 This change in emphasis 
was made more clear in 1995 with Directive 95/46/EC “on 
the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of 
personal data and on the free movement of such data.”184 
The Directive, while not creating uniform enforcement 
across EU jurisdictions, expanded the rights of EU citizens to 
control their data.185 Article 25 on cross-border data flows 
was the clearest signal of the Directive’s pro-privacy stance 
on cross-border transfer of personal data. It provides that 
Member States must guarantee that transferred personal 
                                                 
 
 
182 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data, E.T.S. 108 (Jan. 10, 1985),  
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data will enjoy an “adequate level of protection” outside the 
EU. In making this adequacy determination, the Directive 
specifically instructs Member States to consider, inter alia, 
“the rules of law, both general and sectoral, in force in the 
third country in question and the professional rules and 
security measures which are complied with in that 
country.”186 This adequacy framework is a far cry from the 
OECD’s 1980 trade oriented support for the free movement 
of data, and shows the extent to which the EU has, through 
internal policies, changed the rules regarding data privacy.  
  GDPR rules have already had a significant effect on 
data privacy practices in non-EU jurisdictions. Google, for 
example, has stated that it is “working hard to prepare” for 
the GDPR and that, as a data processor, it “will update our 
agreements to reflect the obligations of controllers and 
processors and offer data-processing agreement where 
required in time for May 2018.”187 Google also cites its 
membership in the EU-US Privacy Shield as a sign of its 
adherence to GDPR rules on the cross-border transfer of 
personal data.188 Privacy Shield is a set of privacy standards 
and protocols, negotiated and implemented by the U.S. 
Department of Commerce and European Commission, “to 
provide companies on both sides of the Atlantic with a 
mechanism to comply with data protection requirements,” 
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including the GDPR.189 Importantly, however, the European 
Commission must review Privacy Shield, and the U.S.’s 
implementation of it, annually to determine whether it 
continues to adequately protect EU citizen privacy. The 
Commission renewed Privacy Shield’s mandate in its first 
review (October 2017), but made a number of notable 
recommendations. The Commission stated that it “would 
welcome if [the] U.S. Congress would consider favourably 
enshrining in the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act the 
protections for non-Americans offered by Presidential Policy 
Directive 28.”190 The Commission also urged the Department 
of Commerce to undertake regular compliance checks and 
actively search for companies falsely claiming to participate 
in Privacy Shield. These recommendations carry real weight 
– as of this first review, 2,400 U.S. companies have signed up 
for Privacy Shield, including some of the largest U.S. tech 
firms (e.g., Google, Facebook, and Microsoft).191 In 2015, the 
United States had to scramble when the European Court of 
Justice found that a previous, less restrictive cross-border 
data regime (Safe Harbor) was inadequately protective of 
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privacy.192 The economic fallout from a non-compliance 
determination, therefore, gives the EU impressive leverage 
to influence data privacy practices in the United States.193 
  While we are far from a formal international legal 
regime for data privacy, there are important causal 
analogues to our prior case studies. In many ways, the 
GDPR is most similar to our discussion of the FCPA. From 
the perspective of material causation, the EU is leveraging its 
outsized importance in the digital economy. As a combined 
entity, its GDP is second only to that of the United States.194 
Its population is greater than that of the United States195 and 
a greater share of its population uses the Internet.196 In fact, 
outside of China and India, the EU has more Internet users 
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than any other jurisdiction.197 This gives the EU incredible 
influence over U.S. tech firms, who are strongly incentivized 
to maintain access to this important market. The FCPA 
similarly leveraged the United States’ unmatched status as a 
locus of capital markets to instantiate anti-bribery rules. 
From the perspective of formal causation, the GDPR (and its 
antecedent directives) has literally redefined data privacy 
and, perhaps more importantly, the balance to be struck 
between privacy and free trade. Again, the FCPA also 
explicitly created new definitions for bribery and changed 
the balance of interests as between corruption and business 
efficacy. The final causes (interests) underlying these 
changes are readily apparent – the GDPR is explicitly placed 
in a philosophical tradition regarding the right to privacy 
extending from Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights198 to Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights.199 The FCPA was similarly universalist in its 
ambition, advancing a normative understanding that 
corruption is undesirable. Given the degree to which GDPR 
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has already redefined the data privacy space, even before 
formal implementation, it is likely too late for the United 
States to create an international data privacy regime that 
would differ appreciably from the European model.  
  Regulation of AI is a more protean example of 
international regime creation by domestic rulemaking. 
China has embarked on a concerted, whole-of-government 
effort to support and regulate AI.200 China’s “New 
Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan” 
declares that China seeks to be at the forefront of AI 
development by 2030.201 This is being underwritten by an 
unprecedented outlay of government funding, to the tune of 
$1 billion in 2017 alone.202 Importantly for our purposes, the 
Chinese government also states that, “Laws and regulations 
about AI should be formulated.”203 It is unclear how quickly 
such rules might be developed, or what their content might 
be. But, only considering material causation, we can expect 
that any Chinese rules will have important international 
effects. China has almost twice as many Internet users as the 
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United States, many of whom use the Internet for far more of 
their daily life than the average American.204 This creates a 
larger pool of data with which algorithms can be tested, 
tweaked, and improved. As of 2016, the number of academic 
papers on artificial intelligence published in China outpaced 
that of the European Union, though it still has not matched 
that of the United States.205 The more China becomes a hub 
for AI innovation, the greater influence its regulations in this 
space will have on the international community. The Obama 
Administration may have realized this insight in 2016, when 
it released a report articulating principles for governing 
AI.206 Since 2016, however, little seems to have been done to 
advance these principles either domestically or 
internationally.  
  Unilateral action by the EU and China regarding data 
privacy and AI yield important takeaways for U.S. 
policymakers. The process of regime creation through 
domestic legal processes is alive and well. Regardless of 
whether other jurisdictions are overt in their attempts to 
create international regimes, the causal parallels to our 20th 
Century case studies show that recent domestic initiatives 
have the potential to powerfully shape and create future, 
formalized international regimes. The United States cannot 
wait until formal negotiations, one day, begin on an 
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international agreement (or norms or whatever new moniker 
is used) regarding cross-border data flows, data privacy, or 
AI. It will already have been too late. The contest over rules, 
and therefore rule, is happening now.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
  Rules, and the international regimes they constitute, 
are powerful conduits for expressing and exercising national 
interests. We see this recognized in the 2018 U.S. National 
Defense Strategy, which decries increasing global disorder 
“characterized by decline in the long-standing rules-based 
international order”207 and calls for engaging with allies to 
“defend[] freedom, deter[] war, and maintain[] the rules 
which underwrite a free and open international order.”208 
Given the importance of international regimes, it is 
particularly unfortunate that the foreign policy community 
has been operating with an impoverished understanding of 
rule creation in international politics. Legal formalism has 
created a deeply ingrained set of assumptions that prevent 
policymakers from crafting international regimes that would 
be best positioned to advance American interests. The above 
case studies show that a different approach, recognizing the 
role of domestic rulemaking, is available. And it has been 
used before. We have seen how domestic legal enactments 
are causal antecedents of the international regimes that 
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currently govern the continental shelf and international 
corruption. Indeed, the same tactics are being used right 
now to begin constructing international rules around data 
privacy and AI. Taken together, these case studies suggest 
that all forms of critical realist causation (material, formal, 
effective, and final) must be mobilized if the United States is 
to compete in an increasingly fractured world. 
  This is not to say that domestic rulemaking is the 
only, or always preferable, method for creating international 
regimes. First, as the number of agents active in international 
politics proliferates, the potential for unintended 
consequences increases. A number of States, for example, 
used President Truman’s proclamation on the continental 
shelf to claim much broader maritime sovereignty. At that 
time, there were only 51 other agents (UN Member States) 
that could contest the United States’ position.209 There are 
currently 193 UN Member States.210 Divining the causal 
effects of domestic legislation on an international regime for 
data privacy, therefore, has only become more difficult. 
Relatedly, and second, the proliferation of agents in 
international politics suggests that there will be more rule 
fractionation before harmonization. Moreover, this 
proliferation of contesting rules on any given issue is more 
likely to be sticky as the relative distribution of power 
between agents in international politics becomes more 
diffuse. But the fact that effects have become more 
indeterminate does not mean that the causal mechanisms 
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should be ignored. As we saw with the FCPA, a well-
rounded strategy can pair domestic rulemaking with 
international engagement over the course of decades to craft 
an international regime that best advances a State’s interests. 
Third, the strategy outlined in this paper has a bias towards 
rulemaking. However, in some issue areas, and particularly 
for status-quo powers, it may be in the State’s interest to 
prevent the creation of new rules. For these States, it is 
important to remember that rules (even if unspoken) always 
exist. It is the job of these status quo agents, therefore, to 
make the rules explicit. This can be achieved through 
domestic legislation, executive proclamations, or other 
public statements. Endorsing the status quo does not require 
ceding the initiative.  
  Moreover, there have been a number of historical 
scenarios in which it was advantageous to begin with 
negotiations at the international level and not rely on prior 
domestic legal enactments. The Antarctic Treaty and Moon 
Treaty provide good case studies. In both, the international 
community came together to decide that extraterrestrial 
objects and the Antarctic should be removed from national 
jurisdiction, and instead preserved for the benefit of all 
humankind into perpetuity. A similar desire to restrict State 
action underpinned the entire nuclear nonproliferation 
regime. While addressing quite different policy spaces, these 
areas of international law are similar in that there is a 
collective action problem. It is not in the interest of any State 
to unilaterally, as a matter of domestic regulation, limit their 
territorial jurisdiction or discontinue developing nuclear 
weapons. It is only when other agents, important in that 
issue area, jointly agree to limit their freedom of action that 
it is safe, as a matter of domestic practice, to enact restraints. 
This suggests that the domestic-first strategy outlined in this 
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paper would not be appropriate for issue sets in which the 
policy objective is to limit a State’s capacity.  
  Taken together, these caveats combined with the 
insights above suggest that policymakers should be mindful 
of the following considerations when deciding whether to 
use my domestic-first approach. First, do you aim to limit 
State capacity, as opposed to expanding its jurisdiction or 
ambit of authority? If so, domestic solutions are unlikely to 
be helpful (unless your State is able to bear the costs of such 
action for a potentially prolonged period of time, as was true 
of the United States in the case of the FCPA). Second, how 
materially capable is your State in this issue space? Given 
the increasingly fractured landscape of international politics, 
a State needs to be quite capable for domestic rules to have 
real international effect. Otherwise, it may be more beneficial 
to create a coalition of like-minded States to enact a similar 
set of rules from the outset. Third, are you prepared to 
manage the range of reasonably foreseeable reactions by 
rivals? As discussed above, it is not possible to fully 
anticipate the ways in which a given set of domestic rules 
will be used by other agents contrary to one’s interests. But 
that does not mean that it is impossible to game out likely 
reactions (for example, the United States could have 
reasonably foreseen that Latin American States would use 
any opportunity to expand their claims to maritime 
sovereignty). If the range of likely reactions cannot be 
managed, it may be wise to modify the proposed rule set to 
better accord with the interests of other. Or act in concert 
with like-minded States from the beginning. Fourth, and 
finally, is it domestically feasible to advance your proposed 
rule set? The answer to this question will differ depending 
on the issue space and current state of politics. For the 
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United States, this issue is complicated by significant 
bureaucratic coordination problems. 
  Within the executive branch, domestic and foreign 
policies are designed by separate agencies using, largely, 
separate staffs. Perhaps more insidiously, law in the 
executive branch’s foreign policy bureaucracy is more often 
treated as a compliance mechanism rather than a tool of 
foreign policy. In Congress, committees that deal with 
foreign relations or defense policy largely do not engage 
with enacting laws that would have domestic effect (other 
than supervision over or funding for their respective 
agencies). Coordination between lawmaking in Congress 
and foreign engagement by the executive is, if possible, even 
more rare. Each of these silos must be bridged to formulate 
innovative legal strategies that leverage domestic 
rulemaking to create international regimes. Because as 
international regimes become increasingly contested, it is a 
great disservice to craft foreign policy with only half a 
toolkit.    
